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At 6:10 AM on August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Plaquemines 
Parish Louisiana as a Category 4 storm.  By then much damage had already begun to 
occur hours earlier as 135 mph winds and 15-25 foot storm surges funneled onto New 
Orleans and into Lake Pontchartrain, overtopping and breaching critical levees adjacent 
to the 9th Ward and the 17th Street Canal.1   
One of the most catastrophic disasters in United States (U.S.) history began to 
unfold before our eyes as we stood by our televisions and radios, wondering what was 
going on and how we could help- so many wanted to do so much to help.  Those that 
could swarmed to the Gulf Coast to help out or they took survivors into their homes.  
Airlines shuttled survivors out of the disaster zone as soon as it was practicable.2  Soon, 
survivors were being relocated to every state in the Union.  Those that could not help 
gave what they could.  The devastation was so vast, though, that it seemed that just 
giving money was not enough.  Many hoped that, and relied on the hope that, the Federal 
Government's response would do what they could not. 
Unfortunately, the area of destruction was so large, over 90,000 square miles, an 
area larger than Great Britain,3 that the Federal government was ill equipped to the effort.  
That being said, the response was massive, heroic, and saved untold number of lives. 
Even so, the Federal Government’s response, specifically the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) response, to Hurricane Katrina has come under a great 
deal of scrutiny.  The general consensus paints a picture of an organization that failed, for 
the most part, to live up to its purpose.  Post- Katrina operations and organization have 
been the focus of many discussions within government and among the many 
                                                 
1  U.S. Congress, Senate Report, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, 4-4. 
2  Interview with Ms. Cheryl Hussey, Technical Publications Editor at Frontier Airlines, (May 6, 
2006). 
3  U.S. Congress, Senate Report, 1-1. 
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stakeholders.  With the risk of future terrorist attacks, environmental disasters, 
geophysical, climate and weather related events at increased levels, many are calling for a 
significant and immediate change in the way the Federal Government, mainly FEMA, 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Defense (DoD), 
responds to these emergencies. 
Despite the heroic response, there were many shortcomings that could have been 
foreseen and avoided.  The response at all levels of government, federal, state, local and 
individual, fell short in many aspects and this has sparked a great deal of controversy and 
calls for reform on many fronts.  One such front that has garnered much public attention 
and intense government scrutiny is that of the Federal Government’s acquisition and 
contracting response to Katrina, with particular attention on the response of FEMA. 
FEMA faced an incredible acquisition and contracting task when Hurricane 
Katrina hit the Gulf States in August 2005.  The scale of the disaster was unmatched in 
our nation’s history and the small organization’s responsibilities were staggering.  
Acquisition and contracting is a fairly straightforward discipline, but it is heavy with 
rules and regulations that hinder fast and effective execution even in normal operations.  
Even with the allowed exceptions to the rules, the scale of Katrina multiplied that 
difficulty exponentially, since so many of the resources and even the suppliers 
themselves were devastated and hindered by destroyed transportation and 
communications infrastructure. 
Considerable public scrutiny has been focused on this supposedly inadequate, 
misdirected, and slow response to the acquisition needs required for responding to the 
aftermath of hurricane Katrina.  This seemingly failed response quite possibly cost the 
federal government billions in wasted taxpayer dollars and has affected the livelihood of 
thousands.  Analyzing what went wrong and examining available acquisition concepts, 
organizations, processes, and technologies that could be leveraged for future disaster 
responses is the focus of our Masters of Business Administration (MBA) Project. 
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 
This report reviews and analyzes the Katrina response and investigates what went 
wrong and why, with emphasis on acquisition processes and disaster relief and response 
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contracting.  We investigated acquisition and contracting initiatives within FEMA and 
other organizations to prepare recommendations so the government response to future 
disasters will not only be more effective, but also to ensure FEMA does not face another 
media disaster as well. 
The project’s product involves providing some proposed solutions to assist 
FEMA’s acquisition mission, along with some recommended technologies for executing 
these solutions. 
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This report focuses on the acquisition and contracting methods FEMA can use for 
immediate disaster response and providing for the basic health of survivors.  The research 
reviews current procedures used in contracting for FEMA and other organizations.  The 
differing methods are compared and analyzed based on FEMA’s organization and goals. 
This report is limited, mainly, to FEMA’s and DHS’s responsibility with disaster 
relief acquisition and contracting during disaster response, though the acquisition 
responsibilities of other Federal entities are discussed in as much as they were a 
participant, and regarding how they can fit into a FEMA acquisition strategy for future 
responses.   The initiatives within FEMA and other organizations provide information for 
an appropriate rapid reaction strategy to respond during large disasters.  This report limits 
the alternatives for contracting to the areas that major government activities currently 
implement and the initiatives that will be implemented. 
This report limits focus to large scale disasters that quickly outsize the available 
local, regional, or state resources, but does not focus on pandemic type emergencies, such 
as the possible mutation and spread of the H5N1 avian flu4, as the containment and 
quarantine aspects of such an event would require contracting strategies beyond the scope 
of this project. 
                                                 
4  The H5N1 avian influenza A virus is a bird adapted subtype of the influenza A virus that is 
spreading across the world, originating from Southeast Asia.  It can cause illness in humans and other 
animals, but is an epidemic in the avian world population.  Many fear this “bird flu” can spread to epidemic 
or pandemic proportions in humans.  Information from Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H5N1]. 
Accessed November 2006. 
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Our assumptions include that readers of this project have a basic understanding of 
general government organizational structure including our armed forces, DoD agencies 
and personnel.  We also assume readers have a basic knowledge of the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR). 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What alternatives are available to improve FEMA’s acquisition processes for 
rapid reaction to large scale disasters within the United States? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a. What Factors Hindered the Federal Government's Response to 
Hurricane Katrina, Including the Acquisition Response? 
b. What Acquisition and Contracting Concepts, Systems, Tools, and 
Technologies are Available that Could Be Leveraged For Rapid 
Response to Future Disasters? 
c. Which Technological Initiatives Should FEMA Pursue to 
Improve the Acquisition Process? 
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology used in this report includes a literature review of 
documents pertaining to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA contracting during disasters, and other 
agencies providing emergency contracting.  This report investigates the Presidential 
Administration, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional 
Reports, as well as other literature associated with the response and we conducted 
interviews with personnel from FEMA, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Joint Staff, 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), 
and the Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (FISCs). 
F. ORGANIZATION OF MBA PROJECT REPORT 
The organization of this MBA project includes:  (1) an overview of the federal 
framework for emergency management, including the history, legislation and 
organizations, (2) a review of the current literature, including government reports and 
articles from reliable sources that critically analyze the acquisition response to Hurricane 
Katrina, (3) a review of alternatives for improving response to possible future disaster 
events,  (4) an evaluation of existing acquisition organizations, systems, policies, 
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concepts, tools or technologies that could possibly be leveraged to optimize disaster relief 
and response acquisition,  (5) an attribute analysis of selected technological alternatives 
to determine priority for implementation, and (6) recommendations for improving the 




























II. DISASTER RESPONSE PRIMER:  WHO IS IN CHARGE? 
The [Katrina] storm involved a massive flood, a major supply and security 
operation, and an evacuation order affecting more than a million people.  
It was not a normal hurricane – and the normal disaster relief system was 
not equal to it.  Many of the men and women of the Coast Guard, the 
FEMA, the U.S. military, the National Guard, and State and Local 
Governments performed skillfully under the worst conditions.  Yet the 
system, at every level of government, was not well-coordinated, and was 
overwhelmed in the first few days. 
   - President George W. Bush, September 15, 2005 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides a general overview of the United States Federal 
Government apparatus for emergency management and disaster response.  A brief history 
of disaster response is presented, followed by a discussion of the guiding disaster 
response legislation, the Stafford Act.  The chapter then outlines the roles and 
responsibilities of the two federal organizations primarily responsible for emergency 
management and disaster response, DHS and FEMA. 
B. HISTORY 
The first federal legislation concerning response to disasters occurred in 1803 in 
response to a New Hampshire town fire.  Over the next hundred years, Congress would 
pass over 100 more acts to respond to fires, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes and other 
natural disasters.  In the 1930s, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation provided for 
disaster loans.  The Bureau of Public Roads was given authority for funding to repair 
roads and bridges damaged by natural disasters in 1934.  The same year, the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers was granted authority to implement flood control projects under the 
Flood Control Act.5  These ad hoc legislations prompted other needs for greater 
cooperation between agencies. 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development created the Federal Disaster 
Assistance Administration to manage federal response and recovery operations.  But with 
                                                 
5  FEMA Website, FEMA History. 
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many catastrophic disasters in the 1960s and 1970s such as Hurricanes Carla, Betsy, 
Camille and Agnes; and earthquakes in Alaska and Southern California, more attention 
led to the passing of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 and the Disaster Relief 
Act of 1974.  By this time, over 100 agencies had responsibilities for disaster response.  
Emergency response was fragmented and many programs were duplicated at state and 
local levels of government.   
With the uncoordinated response systems and an increased threat of nuclear 
attacks and hazardous material spill response, in 1979, President Carter’s executive order 
merged many of the civil defense and disaster response responsibilities into one single 
new agency – FEMA.6  The agency faced many disasters including contamination of the 
Love Canal, the Cuban refugee crisis, Three Mile Island’s nuclear power plant incident, 
Loma Prieta Earthquake and Hurricane Andrew over the following years.7 
FEMA’s response in the first decade generally received praise for quicker 
responses to disasters than had been in the past.  However, around 1990, FEMA’s 
responses began to receive many criticisms.  In particular, Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew 
drew much criticism for lackluster response and difficult bureaucratic procedures.  Many 
critics blamed the excessive number of political appointees in the agency with no 
experience in emergency response - the agency had 10 times the number of political 
appointees as most other government agencies.8 
The agency began a new transformation in 1993 with a disaster mitigation effort 
called “Project Impact” and with FEMA being elevated to a cabinet-level agency.  These 
changes restored the agency’s waning performance and reputation and proved successful 
in improving disaster response throughout the 1990’s and the first part of the new 
century.  One key example was the Nisqually earthquake in February 2001 where homes  
 
 
                                                 
6  U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-746t – Testimony of William Jenkins, 4. 
7  FEMA Website, FEMA History. 
8  Franklin, The FEMA Phoenix, 1995. 
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and schools were retrofitted with high-impact structural changes, requiring minimal 
disaster response.  Unfortunately, though, “Project Impact” was discontinued after this 
earthquake due to decreased funding.9 
After September 11, 2001 (9/11), the agency focused on national antiterrorism 
preparedness and its terrorism related disaster budget increased by billions.  With the 
creation of DHS, FEMA then moved under the new department on March 1, 2003.10  
Though the agency moved under DHS, FEMA initially retained its authority to operate as 
the agency administering the Stafford Act.  The agency trains first responders, initiates 
mitigation activities and shares responsibility for preparing the nation for all disasters.11 
C. STAFFORD ACT 
In response to Hurricane Katrina, President Bush declared a Major Disaster on 
August 29, 2005, authorizing the expenditure of disaster relief funds and the provision of 
federal resources to support relief efforts, pursuant to authority of the Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.12  The Stafford Act, as amended on 
October 30, 2000, is a major revision of the original Disaster Relief Act of 1974.  The 
Stafford Act provides FEMA with the responsibility and authority to prepare for and to 
respond to disasters in the U.S. and its territories.  It outlines the process that must be 
followed by local and state authorities prior to a request for declaration to the President 
and then details the actual Presidential Disaster or Emergency declaration process, both 
pre- and post-event.13   
The Act also establishes Federal Coordinating Officers (FCOs), Joint Field 
Offices (JFOs) and Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) and outlines other aspects of the 
federal apparatus for response to and coordination of declared emergencies and disasters, 
                                                 
9  Franklin, The FEMA Phoenix, 1995. 
10  FEMA Website, FEMA History. 
11  U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-746t – Testimony of William Jenkins, 6. 
12  FEMA, Federal Register Notice 1603-DR. 
13  Bea, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and 
Funding, 2-5. 
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including the provision of assistance by other federal agencies14  The Act outlines the 
types of assistance that may be provided, depending on whether the event is declared a 
major disaster or an emergency and outlines the funding flow upon declaration.  
Generally, assistance provided under both types of declarations include emergency 
evacuation, rescue, shelter, feeding, and other immediate mass care needs, as well as 
critical infrastructure restoration and protection.  The essential differences between these 
two declarations revolve around the scope in which these types of assistance are provided 
and the regulations surrounding their provision.15 
The act charges the President, via the Director of FEMA, to prepare federal 
response plans for emergency preparedness within the agencies of the federal government 
and to coordinate with state and local authorities to plan for and respond to emergencies.  
As such, the act tasks the Director of FEMA to establish and head a task force including 
federal agencies, state and local governments, and the American Red Cross (AMCROSS) 
for coordinating disaster response and pre-disaster hazard mitigation programs across 
jurisdictions throughout the nation.16 
It also encourages state and local governments to prepare and plan for disaster 
response at the local level and reinforces the expectation that state and local authorities 
provide the primary response for emergencies and disasters.  To encourage such planning 
by state and local authorities, the Stafford Act provides robust provisions for grant 
assistance to state and local governments that show a proven ability to provide a 
comprehensive plan to conduct preparedness planning and mitigation efforts.  In many 
cases, this includes grants for up to 75% of the costs.  The Act also charges FEMA to 
work closely with these state and local governments in these planning and preparation 
efforts and may require submission of hazard mitigation or disaster preparedness plans as 
a product of the grant process.17 
                                                 
14  U.S. Congress, Stafford Act, sec. 302 to 306. 
15  Bea, 3-9. 
16  U.S. Congress, Stafford Act, sec. 204. 
17  U.S. Congress, Stafford Act, sec. 201, 203, 322, 404. 
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One important provision of the Stafford Act, section 307, requires that preference 
be given “to the extent feasible and practicable” to local entities within the affected areas 
when contracting for services and resources required by the federal government during 
the response and recovery phases.18  Much debate has ensued since Katrina regarding the 
federal government’s adherence to this during the aftermath of Katrina, especially with 
regards to debris removal and technical assistance contracts for site preparation and hook-
up of FEMA trailers. 
D. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
With the change of government focus towards Homeland Defense after 9/11, the 
Bush Administration developed a new cabinet-level department, the DHS, to prevent 
terrorist attacks within the U.S., reduce our vulnerability to terrorism, and to minimize 
damage from attacks.  DHS assumed all responsibilities under the Stafford Act and 
FEMA’s responsibilities became just one of four divisions at DHS, as the Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Directorate, and the primary focus became to protect the U.S. 
from terrorist activity.19  The new department merged 22 former agencies into one 
centralized department.  All the agencies were required to change their structure to meet 
the new DHS regional chain of command and billions of dollars poured into the new 
department for terrorist preparedness.20 
The new department changed the focus and direction for FEMA.  The agency no 
longer reported directly to the president, but instead to the Secretary of the DHS, who 
then became the President’s new disaster response contact.21  The DHS direction slowly 
removed functions from FEMA and absorbed these functions into other organizations 




                                                 
18  U.S. Congress, Stafford Act, sec. 307. 
19  White House Website, Organization of the Department of Homeland Security. 
20  White House OMB Website, Department of Homeland Security. 
21  U.S. Congress, Senate report, 13-1. 
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2005, one of his top priorities was to reorganize the entire department (see Figure 1), 
which renewed focus on taking away FEMA’s role for prevention and preparedness 
planning.22   
Though DHS claimed an “all hazards” approach, the new department clearly 
focused away from this “all hazards” approach and singled in on terrorism threats,23 with 
three out of four new budget dollars going to the new department directly supported 
terrorism response.  FEMA’s budget was slashed and the pre-9/11 all hazards direction 
had been marginalized with the creation of the DHS.24 
                                                 
22  In an interview with William Carwile (September 16, 2006), the Federal Coordinating Officer for 
Mississippi during Katrina and a leading figure in the federal government’s response to every major 
disaster since Hurricane Andrew, he asserted that much of the re-organization at FEMA and DHS was due 
to personality conflicts between everyone else and Michael Brown, then director of FEMA. 
23  U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Report, A Failure of Initiative, 152. 
24  Glasser and White, Storm Exposed Disarray at the Top, A.01. 
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25  White House OMB Website, Department of Homeland Security. 
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E. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 
FEMA consists of over 2600 full time personnel and consists of four divisions 
and ten regions.  Figure 2 shows the divisional structure and responsibilities.  The ten 
regions work with state and local governments within the region to coordinate disaster 
mitigation and response.  Figure 3 shows a break out of the ten regions’ geographic 
boundaries, along with the location of each region’s headquarters. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Federal Emergency Management Agency Divisions.26 
 
                                                 
26  FEMA Website, Organizational Structure. 
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Figure 3.   Federal Emergency Management Agency Regions and Regional Offices.27 
 
FEMA is the primary organizing activity during presidentially declared disasters 
and operates under the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National 
Response Plan (NRP), which were both restructured in 2004 after the formation of DHS.  
The NIMS provides a “nationwide template for all government levels and private 
organizations to coordinate preparation, prevention, response and recovery from all 
domestic disasters.”  Homeland Security Presidential Directive Five (HSPD-5) requires 
the DHS to prepare and maintain the NRP to integrate a comprehensive plan for the 
structure and mechanics to respond to any events.28  Thus, the NRP establishes an all-
hazards plan and framework to implement the NIMS. 
The NRP can be implemented for recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters 
or other emergencies under any of the below circumstances: 
                                                 
27  White House Report, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 16. 
28  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System. 
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• A Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has 
requested the assistance of the Secretary of Homeland Security; 
• The resources of State and local authorities are overwhelmed and Federal 
assistance has been requested by the appropriate State and local 
authorities; 
• More than one Federal department or agency has become substantially 
involved in responding to the incident; or 
• The Secretary of Homeland Security has been directed to assume 
responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the President.29 
FEMA has been the coordinating agency for the federal response since 1979, but 
since the creation of the DHS, the FEMA Director now reports to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security instead of the President from above as designated in the HSPD-5.  
The Federal response is coordinated through the FCO (the Secretary of Homeland 
Security or delegated official) located at a JFO near the area affected.  The coordination 
follows the Emergency Support Function (ESF) framework.  The ESFs organize 
responsibilities for agencies and private entities as needed, depending on the response 
required.  Table 1 shows the 15 functions and supporting organizations and table 2 lists 
the scope for each function.  
 
 
Table 1.   Emergency Support Functions and supporting agencies/organizations.30 
                                                 
29  Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5.  
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Table 2.   Emergency Support Functions and scope of each function.31 
                                                 
 
30  White House Report, 16. 
31  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (NRP), 12. 
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The Secretary of Homeland Security or delegated representative (the FCO) will 
implement the needed ESF’s for a particular response.  FEMA is the coordinating activity 
as seen under ESF #5 – Emergency Management; but FEMA is supported by many other 
organizations for other functions.  For example, the U.S. Department of Transportation 
(DOT) is tasked to provide support for ESF #1 and the Department of Agriculture is 
responsible for support for forest fires. 
F CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a brief summary of emergency management within the 
U.S. Federal Government, including information on relevant historical background, 
legislation and federal organizations involved.  This information provides a foundational 
knowledge base for understanding the federal response to Katrina and the ensuing 
problems, concerns, and issues that surfaced as a result, especially with reference to 
acquisition processes and disaster relief contracting.  The following chapters present 
these issues, starting with chapter III, which provides a brief summary of the federal 













III. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 
Hurricane Katrina is now designated as a category five hurricane.  We 
cannot stress enough the danger this hurricane poses to Gulf Coast 
communities.  I urge all citizens to put their own safety and the safety of 
their families first by moving to safe ground. 
     - President George W. Bush, August 28, 2005 32 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a brief summary of the major affects of Hurricane Katrina 
on infrastructure and support, and the federal response in general.  It focuses mainly on 
the DHS, FEMA, and DoD responses.  While the chapter discusses specific concerns 
regarding the DHS response, chapter IV provides more detailed discussion of FEMA’s 
involvement and the concerns therein.   
B. OVERVIEW:  THE STORM 
 
Figure 4.   Tropical Storm Katrina on August 25, 2005.33 
                                                 
32  White House, News release: President discusses Hurricane Katrina, congratulates Iraqis on draft 
constitution.  (August 28, 2005). 
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On August 24, 2005, Tropical Depression 12 became a Tropical Storm and was 
named Katrina, the eleventh named storm of the 2005 hurricane season (see Figure 4 
above).  FEMA activated its Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT) to coordinate with the 
National Weather Service and state and local officials.  The storm crossed southern 
Florida on August 26, 2005 as a Category 1 hurricane leaving a dozen deaths, over 1.4 
million power outages, some severe flooding and an estimated $2 billion of destruction in 
its path.34   
 
Figure 5.   Hurricane Katrina path of movement.35 
                                                 
 
33  NOAA Satellite and Information Service website, (August 25, 2005). 
34  U.S. Department of Commerce, National Weather Service, Hurricane Katrina Storm Report, 
(September 1, 2005).  
35  U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration website, (August 
25, 2005). 
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The Gulf States activated their Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) and the 
National Guards were activated in Louisiana and Mississippi on August 26, 2005.  The 
storm strengthened into a category 3 36 and doubled in size while Louisiana activated the 
Emergency Evacuation Plan on the 27th.  Figure 5 above shows the path of the storm.  
Shelters began opening throughout the region by the AMCROSS and Louisiana’s Office 
of Emergency Preparedness.  Mississippi deployed ERTs to coastal counties.  The 
Louisiana and Alabama National Guards sent liaisons to coastal counties.  FEMA 
activated the respective regions on full alert and implemented all 15 ESFs 48 hours 
before landfall in the Gulf. 
On Sunday, August 28, 2005 (day before landfall), Alabama, Louisiana and 
Mississippi began requesting significant assistance from FEMA including food and water 
to the Superdome where over 10,000 people had gathered for shelter.  Only about half of 
the Superdome supplies arrived before the weather prevented further delivery.37  The 
AMCROSS decided to wait until after the storm passed to provide aid to the Superdome 
due to safety concerns of their staff.38 
The storm hit Louisiana at 6:10 a.m. on August 19, 2006.  Storm surge waters 
rose up to 27 feet in Louisiana and Mississippi, flooding up to 12 miles inland.  At lease 
1,330 people were killed and whole communities were destroyed.39  President Bush 
declared the hurricane as “one of the worst natural disasters in our Nation’s history.”40 
There were 2.5 million customers in the three states without power, three million 
without telephone service, 1,477 cell phone towers were down along with radio and 
television stations.  Hospitals and other key infrastructure were unusable.   New Orleans’ 
                                                 
36  A category 3 storm contains winds between 111-130 miles per hour, generally sending a storm 
surge 9-12 feet higher than normal.  Damage generally includes some structural damage to small buildings, 
damage to foliage, destroying mobile homes and flooding up to eight miles inland in areas less than five 
feet above sea level.  Information taken from the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Weather Service 
website, [http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshs.shtml].  Accessed June 2006. 
37  Norton, U.S. Government response to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, (September 1, 2005). 
38  U.S. Congress, House, Testimony of Joseph C. Becker, (December 13, 2005).  
39  White House Report, 33. 
40  White House, News release: President outlines Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, (August 31, 2005). 
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350 mile levee system was breached in several places and 80% of the city was flooded 
with up to eight feet of water.41  Receipt of this information by cognizant authorities was 
sporadic and very unclear at best over the next two days due to conflicting reports and the 
complete devastation of all communications systems. 
C. DHS / FEMA RESPONSE 
The amount of resources needed after the hurricane was more than anticipated and 
historically unmatched.  Almost 250,000 people in shelters and the emergency responders 
relied on food, water, ice and other critical supplies sent by FEMA.  The pre-positioning 
stocks proved inadequate and FEMA could not procure enough supplies fast enough to 
keep up with the incredible demand.  Nonetheless, FEMA provided more supplies in the 
two weeks after Katrina than it provided to Florida for all of the previous year’s 
hurricanes total needs.42 
In preparation for the Florida landfall, FEMA dispatched 100 truckloads of ice, 35 
truckloads of food and 75 truckloads of water to staging areas in Georgia.  With 
predictions of another landfall in the Alabama/Mississippi region, those states activated 
their EOCs for emergency response operations.  FEMA dispatched 400 truckloads of ice, 
500 of water and 200 of food to staging areas in Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia, Texas and 
South Carolina in preparation for the second landfall.  This was the largest pre-
positioning in the Federal history by the time Katrina hit landfall in the Gulf.43  Exhibit 7 
shows the emergency commodity positioning by FEMA in preparation for Hurricane 
Katrina’s landfall.   
FEMA deployed its Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments 
and activated ERT-A (Emergency Response Team) and ERT-N44 teams.  In addition to  
 
 
                                                 
41  White House Report, 34-36. 
42  Ibid., 44. 
43  Ibid., 23. 
44  FEMA has three ERTs (A, B, and C teams) that at least one is always on call and ready for 
deployment.  ERT-N is designed as a national team. 
 23
the major staging of food, ice, water and tarps to the region, FEMA also began activating 
the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), Disaster Medical Assistance Teams 
(DMATs) and Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams.45   
Despite this massive response before, during and after landfall, DHS and FEMA 
both proved incapable of responding to the degree required by the severity of the disaster.  
In total, the federal response, which these two organizations were to manage, was very 
uncoordinated and plagued by many planning, command and control and 
communications issues.  Much concern points to DHS’s failure to provide the broad 
federal oversight required by the National Response Plan (NRP).  The NRP had only 
recently been promulgated (December 2004) and, though DHS wrote the plan, many in 
DHS and FEMA, including the DHS Secretary and the FEMA Director  were extremely 
unfamiliar with implementing the plan.46 Training on the plan had yet to effectively 
begin as well.  This point in particular, has fueled a debate about why more experienced 
emergency management professionals were not in the DHS and FEMA leadership 
ranks.47 
There are also several concerns voiced in the after-action reports regarding why 
the DHS Secretary did not designate Katrina as an Incident of National Significance 
(INS) and implement the NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRP-CIA) prior to landfall.  
Had he implemented the NRP-CIA, he could have used the annexes’ authority to start 
pushing the resources and response capabilities into the target zone prior to landfall, 
bypassing the pull system whereby states must request assistance first.  Concern also 
abounds why the Secretary did not convene the Interagency Incident Management Group 
(IIMG) prior to landfall, which would have brought the heads of the many federal 
agencies that would be involved in the response together to coordinate the push of 
resources. 
                                                 
45  White House Report, 25-27. 
46  U.S. Congress, House Report, A Failure of Initiative, 146; Senate Report, 27-2; White House 
Report, 52-53. 
47  U.S. Congress, House Report, A Failure of Initiative, 132. 
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Many of the reports contest that these shortfalls at DHS and FEMA48 exist 
because the NRP remains vague and unclear in many aspects, especially with regards to 
implementation and coordination of the Emergency Support Functions.49  Indeed, many 
Federal Agencies had yet to put into place their own required emergency response plans, 
as required by the NRP and, thus, implemented their responsibilities without coordinating 
with DHS, FEMA or other organizations.50  These command and control concerns have 
fueled a push towards revamping the NRP to provide for a clearer and vastly more 
unified incident command and response structure.51  While this area of study is ripe for 
continued elaboration and in-depth research, any further detailed analysis of the 
command and control lessons learned are beyond the scope of this project. 
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INVOLVEMENT 
Logistically, FEMA pre-staged more supplies than for any other storm, but its 
efforts still did not come close to providing the level of support required.  As a result, 
DHS implemented the National Response Plan (NRP) and FEMA issued mission 
assignments activating all 15 ESF functions to bring in other federal agencies to assist, 
including the Department of Defense (DoD).  DoD resources and personnel subsequently 
played key roles in every aspect of the federal response to Katrina, especially with 
logistics and acquisition support. 
FEMA attempted multiple times in recent years to upgrade its ability to manage 
and track logistics, but did not possess the staffing or the technology to support any large 
scale disaster.  FEMA competed against the organizations it tasked for logistics support 
and quickly became overwhelmed.  Constantly unknown and changing requirements 
compounded the logistics nightmare for the agency.52 
As a result, on September 3, 2005, FEMA requested that DoD assume all logistics 
operations in Louisiana and Mississippi with a $1 billion obligation authority for 
                                                 
48  FEMA’s shortfalls are discussed in chapter IV of this report. 
49  White House Report, 53. 
50  Ibid., 53. 
51  Ibid., 88. 
52  U.S. Congress, Senate report, 23-1. 
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procurement, transportation and distribution of commodities for the Katrina response.53  
Four key organizations within DoD played major roles in the Katrina response:  U.S. 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM),54 the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE), the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the U.S. Navy.   
1. U.S. Northern Command 
As the combatant commander assigned with responsibility for homeland defense, 
and heeding forecasts of a strong hurricane season, NORTHCOM began preparing for the 
Hurricane season on August 19, 2005, with the issuance of a Severe Weather Execute 
Order.  Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs) were dispatched to the Gulf Coast, 
military installations were alerted for the possibility of being used as staging areas and 
coordination efforts with FEMA were stepped up.  As Katrina started to form, 
NORTHCOM initiated daily teleconferences with other DoD components and FEMA and 
alerted units of the possibility of deployment.55   
All these proactive steps were taken in preparation for receipt of requests for 
assistance per procedures outlined in the NRP.  On Tuesday, August 30, 2005, realizing 
the magnitude of the event and frustrated at the lack of requests, NORTHCOM and DoD 
began to “lean forward” pressuring DHS and FEMA as well as pushing personnel, 
resources and Naval support towards the Gulf Coast in anticipation of eventual 
deployment.56 
Regarding the September 3, 2005 mission assignment for logistics support, U.S. 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM), immediately commenced validating the request and 
developing a picture, in “excruciating detail” of what resources FEMA had ordered into 
                                                 
53  Request was made orally on September 1, 2005 and approved on September 3rd.  U.S. Congress, 
Senate Report, 26-38 to 26-40. 
54  NORTHCOM is a DoD unified command providing command and control for homeland defense 
within the area of responsibility including air, land and sea of the continental US, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, 
Gulf of Mexico and approximately 500 miles of surrounding waters, established on October 1, 2002.  
Information from the NORTHCOM website, [http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/about_us.htm].  
Accessed November 2006. 
55  U.S. Congress, Senate Report, 26-14 to 26-16. 
56  Ibid., 26-24 to 26-28. 
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the region.57  It was at this time that NORTHCOM realized the paucity of the FEMA 
logistics system and began around the clock efforts to track down commodities shipments 
and the status of pending orders, often even calling truck drivers on their cell phones.58.  
These near heroic efforts and constant hard work mapping the existing system and then 
coordinating the movement, ordering, and distribution of supplies by planners and 
virtually every member of the NORTHCOM headquarters staff paid off and the 
commodities situation was stabilized in both Louisiana and Mississippi.  As a result, DoD 
never had to fully take over Katrina logistics operations, but rather provided the 
operational logistics and planning expertise necessary to stabilize the situation.59   
DoD’s competency in logistics and operational planning have prompted some to 
call for the Department to take over disaster response,60 or at least be designated the 
“lead agency” for areas such as logistics.  Current sentiment, however, within the DoD, 
and echoed in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)61 remains that the 
Department will remain a proactive partner,62 greatly strengthening response capabilities 
and lobbying for legislative funding and other changes to allow proactive responses, but 
will not “take over” these responsibilities.63 
2. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) maintains responsibility as the lead 
agency for ESF Three: Public Works and engineering.  The capabilities that USACE 
maintains readiness to provide under this include: temporary housing, temporary roofing, 
emergent infrastructure repair, critical public facility restoration, demolition, and 
                                                 
57  U.S. Congress, Senate Report, 26-40. 
58  Interview with Lieutenant Commander Ed Pidgeon, NORTHCOM Logistics planner during 
Katrina, (September 14, 2006). 
59  U.S. Congress, Senate Report, 26-41 to 26-42. 
60  Ramos and Pereira, Natural Disasters – A Military Option for Increased Responsiveness, 31. 
61  The Quadrennial Defense Review Report is a comprehensive examination every forth year of the 
national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan and other 
policies of the Department of Defense for the next 20 years, mandated by Title 10, Section 118 of the US 
Code.  Information taken from the Department of Defense website, [http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/].  
Accessed November 2006. 
62  U.S. Department of Defense, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 26. 
63  U.S. Congress, Senate report, 26-6. 
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structural inspection.64  During Katrina, USACE’s most urgent priorities were emergency 
levee repairs, the repair of the City of New Orleans massive dewatering pumps and 
equipment, and the ensuing dewatering of the city.65   
Part of the USACE disaster response and recovery mission also includes the 
provision of ice for emergent personal and institutional needs and the acquisition and 
management of contracted debris removal services.  These two areas received a great deal 
of scrutiny in the aftermath of Katrina. 
Due to lack of communication between FEMA and USACE, ice was incorrectly 
routed all throughout the country, not effectively distributed in some areas and over 
distributed in others.  These organizations prepared to provide ice to full populations of 
citizens in stricken areas, only to later realize that many of these citizens had fled.66 
The USACE normally utilizes pre-positioned Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite 
Quantity (ID/IQ) and requirements contracts to respond to emergencies and disasters.  
These contracts are termed “Advanced Contracting Initiative” (ACI) contracts.67  
Ordinarily, these pre-positioned contracts prove invaluable, and they did during Katrina 
as well.  However, the massive devastation of Katrina quickly overwhelmed the ACI’s 
ability and new contracts for such things as debris removal had to be awarded without 
full and open competition.   
The greatest controversy, though involves four $500M competitively awarded 
contracts (22 proposals were received) awarded under expedited procedures.68  The 
controversy involved the USACE’s awarding the contracts without regard for the  
 
 
                                                 
64  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Public Affairs Office Website, Corps Points, (June 27, 2006). 
65  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Katrina, the Corps of Engineers’ response, (August 30, 2006).  
66  U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-746t – Testimony of William T. Woods, 7. 
67  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Website, What is ACI?, (August 21, 2006). 
68  U.S. Congress, House, Testimony of Major General Don T. Riley, (May 4, 2006). 
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Stafford Act local entity preference.69  The Corps has since re-competed these contracts 
and is working to gain more involvement from local contractors on the Gulf Coast in ACI 
contracts. 
USACE possesses a robust emergency response capability, involving pre-scripted 
mission assignments, detailed response planning in each of their major assigned areas, the 
ACI, deployable command and control capabilities, mission guides and many other 
resources, including disaster response experts.70  Though there were other contracting 
issues faced by USACE during Katrina, continued focus to this degree along with 
incorporation of lessons learned should prove beneficial in future disaster responses. 
3. Defense Logistics Agency 
DLA’s response to Hurricane Katrina primarily involved the sourcing, staging 
and transportation of over 30 million Meals, Ready-to-Eat (MREs), as well as the 
provision of 4.5 million gallons of fuel.  In addition, DLA proactively managed emergent 
medical requirements to fully outfit the Military Sealift Command’s hospital ship USNS 
COMFORT in preparation for deployment to New Orleans and provided large amounts 
of bottled water, cots, blankets and numerous other (military/commercial dual use) 
required commodities.71   
The organization partnered quickly with FEMA after landfall to ensure the 
highest level of support possible.  However, realizing that the ad-hoc nature of this 
partnership, though successful, was not conducive to proactive emergency response, 
DLA has partnered with FEMA to become one of the primary providers of supply chain 
logistics and contracting support for FEMA in future disasters.  In support of this 
initiative, DLA personnel have engaged FEMA in planning and exercise efforts, drafted 
an interagency agreement outlining how this support will be implemented and created a 
mobile logistics support capability in the form of a deployable depot, known as the DLA 
Deployable Depot (DDX) and based out of Defense Distribution Center Susquehanna, 
Pennsylvania (DDSP).  The DDX is capable of standing up a fully functional receiving                                                   
69  U.S. Congress, House, Testimony of James Necaise, (May 4, 2006). 
70  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Public Affairs Office Website, Corps Points, (June 27, 2006). 
71  U.S. Defense Logistics Agency Website.  DLA support to Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. 
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and distribution hub in a large parking lot or other lay-down area quickly after a disaster.  
Permanent liaisons have also been established between DLA and NORTHCOM to further 
planning efforts.72 
Per ESF One, the DOT maintains responsibility for contracting movement of 
resources during a disaster.  Managing and contracting complex material movement 
networks is not a core competency of  DOT and this became readily apparent during 
Katrina, as there was no asset visibility of resources en-route or  at destinations.  
Recognizing this, NORTHCOM and DLA sought and received approval for DLA to 
manage the resource transportation logistics.  This allowed some measure of visibility 
and finally started to improve commodity distribution.  DLA has since engaged FEMA to 
develop a fully operational transportation management system for future disasters. 73 
4. U.S. Navy 
The U.S. Navy dispatched an aircraft carrier, an Expeditionary Strike Group74, 
several other amphibious ships, a hospital ship, a mine countermeasures ship, a 
Construction Battalion (SEABEE), and a salvage and rescue ship to assist after Katrina 
landed.  The ships brought supplies, provided command and control for FEMA and 
conducted search and rescue during the aftermath.75  The deployment of 2,800 SEABEEs 
was the second largest peacetime deployment in the United States.  They cleared over 
200 miles of roads, delivered 170,000 gallons of fuel and water, repaired over 90 schools, 
restored utility services, delivered food, and removed 3,500 tons of debris.76   
With respect to contracting, the U.S. Navy generally did not coordinate support 
with FEMA or other organizations.  All support for the Navy forces and ships was 
                                                 
72  Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Carr, DLA Defense Logistics Operations Center, (July 
17, 2006). 
73  U.S. Congress, Senate report, 24-41 and LtCol Carr interview. 
74  An Expeditionary Strike Group is a set of amphibious landing ships, formerly known as an 
Amphibious Ready Group, added with strike capability ships such as a cruiser, destroyer, frigate and fast-
attack submarine.  This structure provides more strike capabilities than our traditional Carrier Battle 
Groups, providing twice as many “Strike Groups” with Carrier Strike Groups and ESGs.  Information 
received from Global Security website, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/esg.htm].  
Accessed November 2006. 
75  Miles, More active, guard troops join Katrina response, (September 3,2005). 
76  U.S. Navy, Navy Seabee Katrina Relief Effort Fact Sheet, (September 19, 2005). 
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brought from other locations via ships or contracted locally through Navy contracting 
sources.  The Navy competed for the same resources as FEMA and other agencies 
without overall coordination through FEMA.77 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, focusing on 
DHS, FEMA and DoD.  It also briefly outlined shortcomings in the DHS’s response, 
including inadequacies in the NRP and the failure of the DHS leadership to utilize certain 
provisions of the NRP to produce a more proactive, agile response. 
However, many of the shortcomings with the FEMA disaster relief acquisition 
and contracting response stem from systemic problems and issues throughout FEMA that 
must be addressed before any acquisition and contracting improvements can be 
realistically expected.  To be sure, almost every practice on the contracting “DON’T GO 
THERE” list was encountered as poorly trained and resourced acquisition professionals 
struggled to procure lifesaving supplies and services.  Again, though, these are merely 
symptoms of deeper, more endemic problems and issues that must be addressed before 
acquisition and disaster relief contracting at FEMA can be expected to improve. 







                                                 
77  Interview with Lieutenant Commander Chris Parker, Naval Supply Systems Command Code 02 
Staff, (July 17, 2006). 
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IV. WHAT WENT WRONG? 
A. OVERVIEW 
FEMA is a small organization with a huge responsibility to ensure everything 
works correctly and efficiently during times when correctness and efficiency are 
nonexistent.  The organization has been criticized by the public media and Congress for 
its handling of the Katrina response from command and control difficulties to the 
contracting methods used and the contract award process.  FEMA’s difficulties in 
acquiring emergency supplies, commodities and services, along with managing a 
coordinated acquisition response across the Federal Government is the general theme 
throughout this project. 
This chapter presents the data regarding reported shortfalls with the federal 
response to Katrina.  While many issues abound throughout the myriad organizations 
involved in the response, the authors focus primarily on FEMA and, to an extent, on DHS 
since the primary coordination responsibility resided within these two organizations. 
The chapter begins with a strategic analysis of FEMA, briefly touching on how 
several organizational structures, command and control and other issues hindered the 
organization’s acquisition and contracting response to Hurricane Katrina.  Then it pulls 
out the most critical of these issues, such as funding, the acquisition workforce and 
supply chain shortfalls, and discusses them in further detail. 
B. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF FEMA AND IT’S RESPONSE TO KATRINA 
1. What Went Wrong at FEMA? 
FEMA mounted the largest deployment of personnel and resources in the 
organization's history.  As previously mentioned, the work of FEMA employees and 
everyone involved has been characterized as nothing short of extraordinary, and, to be 
sure, many things can and do go wrong when a catastrophe strikes and the response 
called for is immense and immediate.  The important issue is whether all involved then 
take stock and learn from these mistakes and take measures to prevent them in the future.   
This learning and growth process, as evidenced by the large amount of media 
attention and scrutiny, began in earnest shortly after Katrina’s landfall.  The results of this 
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process are now emerging from many organizations in the state, local and Federal 
governments.  Particularly, the White House, the Senate and the House of 
Representatives have recently released their Katrina “lessons learned” reports. These 
reports cover in great depth the many shortfalls and provide recommended solutions.  
From these three reports, especially, several main themes emerge with respect to FEMA's 
shortcomings in responding to Katrina. 
a. Inadequate Command and Control  
The basic building blocks for command and control at FEMA either did 
not exist or were outdated.  According to William Carwile, the FCO for Mississippi, 
disaster response doctrine had not been developed in over four years.78  Along with 
doctrine, no operational planning had occurred to align a FEMA response with the 
NRP.79  Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were characterized by all three of the 
reports as either non-existent, under development, outdated or mis-aligned to the NRP.  
Critical response personnel at both FEMA and DHS lacked critical working knowledge 
of the NRP, the NIMS and ICS.  As well, the major restructuring of FEMA, as a result of 
its realignment under DHS in 2003, resulted in a lack of clarity in both organizations 
regarding roles and responsibilities and basic response procedures and this greatly 
contributed to the inefficient and inadequate response.  No one, up or down the chain of 
command, had any clear guidance or training for crafting an effective disaster response. 
b. Underdeveloped and Inadequate Response Capabilities 
FEMA does have a well designed system of response teams to respond to 
disaster events. 80  These include:  ERT-N, DMAT, USAR, Federal Incident Response 
Support Teams (FIRST) and a host of others.  The problem lies in that these teams are 
under-funded, under-manned, under-equipped, under-trained, or non-existent.  For 
example, while the NRP calls for four ERT-N of about 125 to 175 personnel each, only 
two existed during Katrina and they were composed of only about 25 personnel per 
                                                 
78  U.S. Congress, Senate report, 14-11. 
79  White House report, 53. 
80  U.S. Congress, Senate report, 14-8 to 14-11 and House Report, 158. 
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team.81  The ERT-N sent to Katrina was newly formed and had not trained.  Hiring for 
FIRST teams had only begun in the summer of 2005 and there were no teams yet in 
existence.  These are the “rapid deployers” of FEMA with the mission of being the first 
on the ground.  This story repeats itself over and over for each type of team.  Of greatest 
concern is the severe lack of training opportunities provided.  Finally, the surge 
workforce for FEMA, the current cadre of Disaster Assistance Employees (DAE), 
consists of only about 4000 individuals, mostly retired personnel, which have only a 40 to 
50 percent availability rate; and are, for the most part, ill trained and ill suited to the 
task.82 
c. Personnel Shortages 
At the time Katrina hit, FEMA had over 500 vacant positions and had 
been working with upwards of a 20% vacancy rate across the organization for the past 
three years.83  Further, many critical leadership positions remained unfilled because the 
incumbents either reached retirement age or left due to low morale.84  The core cadre of 
disaster response and emergency management corporate knowledge had eroded rapidly in 
the last four years.  Remaining personnel were forced to work longer and deploy more 
often to make up these shortfalls, further decreasing morale.85  In addition, they were 
receiving almost no training on core skill sets needed for disaster response due to funding 
shortfalls.  Not only was FEMA chronically understaffed, they were also not given 
opportunities to become adequately equipped with skill sets to perform.  This caused 
large manning shortfalls during the Katrina response that necessitated the recruiting of 
U.S. Forest Service and City firefighting personnel from across the nation to fill critical 
leadership positions at the county and city levels in several key areas of the Katrina strike 
zone.86  As well, the completion of the Incident Management Handbook had yet to be 
                                                 
81  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, 40. 
82  U.S. Congress, Senate report, 14-9. 
83  Ibid., 14-7. 
84  U.S. Congress, House report, 157. 
85  U.S. Congress, Senate, Testimony of William Carwile, (December 8, 2005). 
86  Ibid. 
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completed as of August 2005 due to lack of personnel.87  These personnel shortages 
become a compounded and complex problem when viewed in the light of the many calls 
to either strengthen or greatly increase the size of FEMA to allow effective disaster 
response or to just disband the organization all together. 
d. Inadequate Acquisition and Logistics Systems 
Acquisition.  The personnel shortage cuts across many areas of FEMA 
compounded or caused many other difficulties.  FEMA's acquisition and contracting 
workforce totals only 36 personnel, 65% of the authorized 55 full-time employees (FTEs) 
and only 28% to 30% of what many recommend as a minimum of 100 to 125 FTEs just 
to manage workload in any given year, with many more required for incident response.88  
These manning shortfalls directly caused many of the contracting issues related to 
Katrina.  Faced with the urgent needs brought about by this storm, FEMA issued over 
50% if its contracts over $500,000 under “other than full and open competition” 
conditions.  Many contracts were not even awarded on paper at all.  Companies were just 
told to ship or provide the service and send the invoice to FEMA.89  Four of the largest 
contracts together valued at over $1.5 billion were awarded without any competition to 
four companies that they were currently in negotiations with to manage the life cycle of 
temporary housing facilities.90  FEMA's lack of ability to effectively manage the 
acquisition process and the negative press towards contractors it generated will likely also 
affect the effectiveness of future responses.  As the House report puts it, “The intense 
public scrutiny could limit the willingness of private sector organizations to offer 
assistance during future disasters.”91  
Logistics.  FEMA's logistics system completely lacks Asset Visibility.  
With this system, there is no way of knowing where ordered material is in the supply and 
transportation chain or if it has been received and utilized effectively at the required 
                                                 
87  U.S. Congress, Senate report, 14-7. 
88  Ibid., 14-11. 
89  U.S. Congress, House report, 330. 
90  U.S. Congress, House, Testimony of Matt Jadacki, (May 4, 2006). 
91  U.S. Congress, House report, 337. 
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location.92  Lack of robust distribution skills and capabilities also severely hampered the 
Katrina effort, even though there large amounts of basic necessities staged throughout the 
region (see Figure 7).  On a micro-level, when material arrived at any given staging point, 
there was no organized system for matching it to a need.  On a macro-level, mechanisms 
for other agencies and companies to provide/donate logistics, material support and 
assistance were haphazard and ineffective.93 
e. FEMA's Organizational Positioning 
Four phases make up the cycle of Integrated Emergency Management 
(IEM): Preparedness, Response, Recovery and Mitigation.  When FEMA officially 
became a part of DHS in 2003, DHS moved the preparedness mission out of FEMA and 
into a new Preparedness Directorate.  According to many experts at FEMA, and at other 
Emergency Management organizations, all four phases must be carried out in an 
integrated fashion to be effective.   
In order for FEMA to work effectively with regional, state, and local first 
responders during a disaster, they have to work with, guide and train with them on an 
ongoing basis before the disaster strikes.  The preparedness phase is where this 
coordination takes place.  Taking this function out of FEMA left the organization without 
an effective vehicle for working with these critical stakeholders.94  Placing FEMA under 
DHS did (and still does) make sense, but many of its critical resources, functions, budgets 
and authorities were stripped or transferred to other DHS directorates.  DHS's prime 
focus on terrorism and lack of attention to an “all-hazards” disaster preparedness 




                                                 
92  White House report, 56. 
93  Ibid., 44-45. 
94  House report, 151, but discussed in almost every major “Lesson's Learned” and GAO report on this 
subject. 
95  Ibid. 
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f. Other Challenges 
• Unqualified Senior Leadership:  A majority of the senior 
leadership at FEMA were political appointees with no emergency 
management experience, including the Director during Katrina, 
Michael Brown, and his Chief of Staff, Patrick Rhone.96 
• Budget Shortfalls:  When FEMA was moved into DHS, several 
“taxes” were imposed on the organization as part of its inclusion in 
the department.  Arguments for the legitimacy or illegitimacy of 
these cuts and transfers provide compelling support for both sides 
of the argument.  What proves itself clear, though, is an average 
resulting decrease of 15% in FEMA's discretionary spending 
accounts since joining DHS and an increasingly difficult 
bureaucratic process to request funding.  This process hampered 
the implementation of critical planning, training, and preparedness 
initiatives that would have enhanced the response to Katrina and 
contributed significantly to the many other shortfalls identified 
thus far.97 
• Communications:  While FEMA did possess and preposition 
MERS at each state’s EOC and elsewhere (unfortunately not in 
New Orleans, though), the size of the devastation required much 
more capability to be in place.98  Communications problems 
affected the entire response, not just FEMA's response.  Lack of 
interoperability between federal, state, and local communications 
systems, coupled with the massive destruction of the Gulf region's 
communications infrastructure, and made coordinating the 
response inefficient, far less effective and much slower.99 
As these shortcomings overwhelmingly evidence, FEMA was found 
lacking not so much in their response to Katrina as in their lack of preparedness to 
effectively respond.  This theme is repeated on the federal, state, local, and regional 
levels throughout these reports and many others.  We remain, as the Senate report's title 
so effectively puts it, “A Nation Still Unprepared.”   
Interestingly, FEMA recognized their ill equipped state and quite often 
lobbied stake-holders repeatedly for the resources and organizational authority to 
                                                 
96  U.S. Congress, Senate report, 14-4. 
97  U.S. Congress, Senate report, 14-6 and House Report, 156. 
98  U.S. Congress, House report, 168-169. 
99  White House report, 55-56. 
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overcome these barriers and shortcomings.  Why was it then that they were unable to do 
so?  While there is no single answer to this question, it bears a deeper look.  We suggest 
that one possible reason lies in the influence of FEMA's stakeholders upon the 
organization and the strong effect that these stakeholders quite possibly had in creating a 
culture bound by the forces of organizational inertia.100 
2. FEMA and Its Stakeholders 
In a May 4, 2006 interview with Ms. Deidre Lee, the new Deputy Director for 
Operations at FEMA (appointed in April 2006, seven months after Katrina), she 
suggested that many of the issues beleaguering FEMA stem from the organization's 
“failure to manage expectations.”101  She suggested that FEMA failed to interact with its 
stakeholders in a way that both apprised state and local emergency management, first 
responders and victims of FEMA's mission, capabilities, and limitations and let DHS 
know the gravity of the organization's unprepared state.  While there is ample evidence 
that FEMA frequently discussed their lack preparedness with people at DHS and the 
White House, there remains some question with regard to the tenacity with which they 
pursued this if they were unsuccessful.  Though, this too might be able to be blamed on 
the lack of qualified leadership, the lack of personnel and the many other issues discussed 
above. 
The framework matrix in Figure 6 provides a good tool for presenting FEMA's 
current, post-Katrina stakeholders, characterizing their influence on the organization and 
touching on what FEMA can do to manage these relationships. 
 
 
                                                 
100  Meyer and Zucker, Permanently Failing Organizations, 23-25. 
101  Telephone Interview with Deirdre Lee, FEMA Chief Acquisition Officer, (May 4, 2006). 
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Figure 6.   Diagnostic typology of FEMA’s stakeholders.102 
 
• Mixed Blessing:  Mixed blessing stakeholders consist of those that have 
both the high potential for threat and for cooperation.  These are basically 
organizations that have both a lot of power over FEMA and a vested 
interest in the organization's performance.  The most obvious of these 
would be the Department of Homeland Security.  Since DHS controls the 
main resources required by FEMA to alleviate its shortfalls, namely funds, 
authority and a large pool of manpower and skill sets, FEMA's leaders 
need to foster a strong, cooperative relationship with the DHS.  They 
should aggressively make the case for stronger support and a larger 
resource base and “sell” the other organizations within DHS on the 
capabilities FEMA can 'bring to the fight' if given these resources.  This is 
termed within the framework as the Collaborative strategy. 
                                                 
102  In the 1991 Academy of Management Executives white paper entitled Strategies for Assessing 
and Managing Organizational Stakeholders by Savage, Nix, Whitehead and Blair, a framework for 
assessing organizational stakeholders is presented.  The framework divides stakeholders into four broad 
categories, Mixed Blessing, Supportive, Non-Supportive and Marginal and then presents strategies for 
managing and then transforming relationships with stakeholders.  Where each stakeholder falls depends on 
the stakeholder's potential for threat or potential for cooperation. 
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• Supportive:  Supportive stakeholders have high potential for cooperation 
and pose a low threat.  These stakeholders may or may not have a large 
amount of power to influence the organization.  In the post-Katrina 
environ, the United States Senate seems to be the organization's strongest 
advocate, judging from the tone of the Senate's Katrina report.  While the 
report does call for “abolishing” FEMA, the alternative spelled out is 
basically just a re-naming of the organization to the National Preparedness 
and Response Authority (NPRA), restoring its advisory power and 
reporting relationship to the President and re-aligning the preparedness 
function back under the organization.103  To be sure, much more is 
involved, but this summarizes the fundamental changes.  FEMA should 
work hard to nurture this relationship and similar relationships, such as 
those with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and involve these 
stakeholders in this transformation process. 
• Non-Supportive:  Non-Supportive stakeholders are those with a high 
potential for threat and a low potential for cooperation.  They may consist 
of major dissatisfied customer groups or activists against the organization 
that could possibly possess a lot of power to marginalize the organization 
through non-use of the offered services or publicly decrying the 
organization's effectiveness.  In FEMA's case, this consists mainly of the 
state and local governments, especially in Louisiana, and the first 
responders who felt ill served by FEMA's efforts during Katrina.  When 
discussing FEMA's “failure to manage expectations,” this is 
predominantly the audience that Ms. Lee was referring to.  FEMA should 
seek to educate these groups on the role that FEMA was intended to play 
and remind them of their own responsibilities under the NRP.  While the 
framework terms this a defend strategy, educating seems a more 
appropriate and effective strategy. 
• Marginal:  Marginal stakeholders possess a low potential for threat or for 
cooperation and may typically include groups that either do not have a 
vested interest in either or lack the power to influence.  In FEMA's case, 
the most critical of these stakeholders is probably the victim in need.  
However, the most pressing is probably the media.  The media's lack of a 
vested interest in either threatening or cooperating with FEMA revolves 
around the desire to report the news that will garner the greatest audience. 
FEMA should take advantage of this very key trait and aggressively steer 
the media towards a more supportive role.  By seeking to educate (rather 
than just monitor) the media regarding FEMA's intended, desired future 
role and the challenges facing the organization, FEMA could possibly use 
the media's ability to sway public opinion as an effective strategic 
communications tool. 
                                                 
103  U.S. Congress, Senate report, Foundational Recommendation #1. 
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Here are two final notes on stakeholders.  First, Katrina very much put FEMA's 
shortcomings in the spotlight.  A great deal of angst towards FEMA remains among all 
stakeholders, even the most supportive ones.  Thus, classifying each one proved a rather 
tentative science.  The line remains very thin, especially with marginal stakeholders such 
as the media.  Second, and as a result, FEMA's ideal strategy should be to not only 
manage these relationships, but also to aggressively work at transforming them into more 
positive ones (see Figure 6 arrows).104  
3. Organizational Inertia 
Organizational inertia has brought FEMA almost to a grinding halt.  FEMA's 
failure to actively manage its stakeholder relationships may have contributed significantly 
to its ineffective response to Katrina and to the relatively negative reputation that the 
organization now possesses.  A more aggressive, pro-active and collaborative approach 
from the onset of the changes that began with FEMA's inclusion in DHS would have 
served the organization far better.   
Instead, FEMA's leadership complacency led to its many stakeholders, especially 
DHS, managing, and thus defining, FEMA's interactions with its stakeholders.  The end 
result is a strong organizational inertia that has made course changes at FEMA not only 
difficult, but almost impossible.  FEMA is now, to borrow a familiar Navy term, “dead in 
the water.” 
To be fair, FEMA's Director did play the role of the “lone voice in the desert,” 
calling often for change and more resources.  While some effort towards creating a plan 
did begin in January 2005, the business cases that DHS required were slow in coming.  
They were only partially complete by the time Katrina hit.105   
Not much evidence exists, though, that anything like this was contemplated early 
on, at the onset of the reorganization process, to lead the organization through the  
 
 
                                                 
104  Savage, et al., 71. 
105  U.S. Congress, Senate report, 14-8. 
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changes.  An objective assessment, creation of a strategy to address the highlighted 
resources, manpower and placement concerns and an aggressive follow-thru would have 
markedly changed the outcome. 
This discussion on organizational inertia at FEMA thus far provides a general, 
though highly revealing, insight into FEMA's sufferings from this organizational malady.  
Table 3 below relates organizational inertia at FEMA to the two specific types of inertia, 
cognitive and action, each type’s main tenets and how these affected FEMA as well.106 
 
 
Table 3.   Organizational inertia at the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 
In summary, FEMA’s organizational inertia, especially its “sticky routines” very 
possibly resulted from the consequences of its falling victim to divergent interests among 
its many stake-holders.  In trying to please all, they pleased none and became ineffective 
                                                 
106  Gavetti, Strategy Formulation and Inertia, 1-11. 
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in the process.107  FEMA’s critical responsibilities, instead, require it to quite proactively 
manage these stakeholder relationships and expectations rather than allow such divergent 
goals to define its mission.108 
C. FUNDING 
When the authors first started researching the federal response to Hurricane 
Katrina, it was initially thought that disaster funding was an area of great concern.  
However, research conducted through many interviews and literature reviews, leads the 
authors to conclude that departmental funding, or the lack thereof, at FEMA played a 
very large role in agency’s inadequate response. 
1. FEMA Funding 
Subsequent to FEMA being brought in under the DHS umbrella, the agency’s 
funding fell in steep decline.  Its budget base was cut by 15% almost immediately after 
coming under DHS and then several “assessments,” with various reasons given by DHS, 
totaling $170 million over the 2003 and 2004 fiscal years were charged against FEMA’s 
budget.  In addition to funding cuts, funding requests for badly needed catastrophic 
planning were denied.109  After the preparedness function was moved out of FEMA, 
preparedness and mitigation grant funding was also cut for non-antiterrorism related 
projects.110 
These severe budget issues wreaked havoc on FEMA’s capabilities in just about 
every facet of the agency’s operations.  Badly needed supply chain improvements were 
shelved and personnel shortages spiraled out of control throughout the organization, 
especially in the acquisition workforce.  Training of the ERTs virtually ceased after 2002, 
prompting very dire, harsh, and pointed communications from the cadre of FCOs (the 
team leaders) to the leadership of FEMA and DHS.111  They asserted that this lack of 
                                                 
107  Meyer and Zucker, Permanently Failing Organizations, 25. 
108  Ibid., 24. 
109  U.S. Congress, Senate report, 14-6. 
110  U.S. Congress, House report, 152-153. 
111  Ibid., 158 and Interview with William Carwile, (September 16, 2006). 
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training and necessary equipment would eventually create large gaps in the 
organization’s capability to respond…and it did! 
Every part of the agency suffered.  Because there were not adequate funds, and 
thus resources, virtually every response capability that FEMA possessed fell into 
disrepair and this became markedly evident during Katrina.  Most every FEMA 
shortcoming pointed out in the aftermath of Katrina can be traced back to this one simple 
reason, one with a simple solution. 
2. Disaster Funding 
Once the President declares an emergency or disaster and enacts the Stafford Act, 
disaster funding can be used to resource and support the response.  However, the Stafford 
Act also mandates that federal organizations provide whatever assistance is required to 
respond to an emergency or disaster, with or without reimbursement. 112  These 
organizations must use funds from their operating budgets and bear uncertainty regarding 
whether or not they will receive reimbursement.   
This lack of assurance of reimbursement can make an agency slow to respond 
until directed.  Indeed, many federal government organizations operate on a 
reimbursable, fee for services, basis and cannot respond adequately or at all without prior 
funding.  In an interview with Kathy Montgomery, the Chief of the General Services 
Administration (GSA) Office of Emergency Management and Interagency Response, she 
cited this as one of the greatest barriers to more effective GSA support to FEMA in 
carrying out the GSA ESF Seven Resource Support responsibility.113  This sentiment 
rang true at the DLA.  Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Dennis Carr from the DLA Defense 
Logistics Operations Center (DLA DLOC) indicated that, although DLA has a large 
reserve in the form of the Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF) and was able to take 
many of the Katrina related costs (especially man-hours) “outta hide,” this could also 
potentially inhibit DLA’s ability to assist during future disasters.   
                                                 
112  U.S. Congress, Stafford Act, sec. 304. 
113  Interview with Ms. Kathy Montgomery, GSA Office of Emergency Management and Interagency 
Response, (July 19, 2006). 
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Many of the reports and writings in the aftermath of Katrina, including the White 
House report, the Senate report, and at least one GAO report indicate this lack of explicit 
authorization for pre-declaration preparations (and funding) as one of several 
shortcomings in the Stafford Act that requires action soon.114 
D. THE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE 
Recently, the entire FEMA organization operated with personnel shortages of 15 
to 20% vacancies in positions due to budget shortfalls.  At that, many of the critical 
positions were filled with other than full time, fully benefited employees.  These 
temporary employees filled one-year or four-year appointed contract positions under the 
Stafford Act without eligibility for the benefits accorded career civil servants.  These 
staffing shortfalls markedly reduced the ability for adequate disaster relief contracting 
preparation and response.115 
In the procurement office, 55 positions were authorized but funding shortfalls did 
not provide for that many employees.  When Katrina hit, the procurement office 
employed 36 personnel.  A 2005 DHS procurement capabilities study listed FEMA’s 
procurement office as “red,” or understaffed, and that the agency really needed 95 – 125 
personnel for a normal procurement workload.116   
With this severely undermanned acquisition workforce, the catastrophic 
devastation of Katrina compounded the problem.  Critical contracts were slow to 
complete, planned procurement measures were sidestepped and awarded non-
competitively, often even verbally.  The former FEMA Director of Response, Eric 
Tolbert testified, “[t]hat’s the reason all these contracts are done as emergency contracts 
that are never complete because there’s no capability in FEMA to do procurement…the 
procurement capability in FEMA also is dead.”117 
                                                 
114  White House report, 70; Senate report, Foundational Recommendation #7; GAO 06-746t, 9. 
115  U.S. Congress, Senate report, 14-7. 
116  Ibid., 14-11. 
117  Ibid., 14-12. 
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FEMA’s Chief Acquisition Officer did urgently request assistance from the DHS 
Office of the Inspector General (DHS-IG) for procurement oversight, and DHS-IG 
assigned 60 employees and immediately took action to start hiring additional personnel. 
Eventually, 13 agencies provided hundreds of acquisition personnel for the Katrina 
response and, particularly the DoD, with the Defense Contract Management Agency 
(DCMA) and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) providing a cadre of auditors and 
other personnel to provide oversight.118   
The acquisition division office had, out of necessity due to budget cuts, become 
very reactive and lacked future event planning capability.  Some of the biggest criticisms 
have been the amount of contracts that were awarded without competition and without 
the preference for local or disadvantaged companies.  Both of these issues counter the 
general principle of the Stafford Act, but the massive devastation from the largest disaster 
in U.S. history supported the need to accomplish critical tasks rapidly, vice slowing the 
process.  Although, more criticism has come from FEMA not re-competing contracts in 
the months following the disaster when the response turned into recovery.  In the “Fog of 
War” that ensued during the Katrina response and recovery, funds were wastefully spent 
with little controls or oversight simply because there were not enough trained personnel 
in the FEMA acquisition workforce.119 
E. SUPPLY CHAIN SHORTFALLS 
As discussed earlier in this project, with the various entities that responded to the 
catastrophe, Katrina overwhelmed everyone’s expectations.  The impact covered 90,000 
square miles, an area the size of the United Kingdom.  Ten times as many homes were 
destroyed than were from Hurricane Andrew, the most recent devastating hurricane, and 
the economic destruction equaled more than both Hurricane Andrew and the 9/11 terror 
attacks combined.120   
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When disaster strikes, certain commodity types and near commodity supplies and 
services become immediately critical to the life, health, safety, and security of those in 
the affected area.  Table 4 includes some of the most critical items.121 
 
 
Table 4.   Critical supply commodities for emergency responses.122 
 
Without question, the movement and pre-staging of these emergency commodities 
prior to Katrina’s landfall was unequaled in FEMA’s or the nation’s history (Figure 7).  
However, it was not enough.  Thousands of citizens remained stranded with no access to 
these critical supplies and services as FEMA and all the agencies involved attempted to 
piece together how to get the pre-staged supplies to the areas of most critical need and to 
ensure a steady and continuous flow of supplies into the region.  As the secretary of the 
DHS so succinctly put it, “FEMA’s logistics systems simply were not up to the task.”123 
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Figure 7.   Emergency commodity positioning prior to Katrina landfall124 
 
Indeed, FEMA’s contracting and logistic capabilities did not meet the needs either 
before Katrina’s landfall or during the weeks of the aftermath, exposing yet another 
emergency response shortfall at the agency.  While the lack of resources and funding 
played a major role in this, many other factors contributed.  Discussed now are some of 
the impacts of these supply chain shortfalls. 
1. Logistics 
Some supply requests were not met for weeks after submission.  Ineffective 
communication and lack of asset visibility complicated the process and left many orders 
not arriving at the intended locations.  Many housing resources made available by other 
government agencies were never offered to evacuees and were not used.  Private 
companies found it difficult to track down a FEMA representative to coordinate support.  
FEMA did not coordinate with retail chains for their supply line support for better and 
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more efficient deliveries.  FEMA turned to the DoD for major support in logistics and the 
NORTHCOM began execution on September 3, 2005 for logistical support to Louisiana 
and Mississippi. 
Then FEMA Director, Michael Brown, summed up the enormous logistics 
problem for FEMA in an address to a Select Committee Hearing on September 27, 2005: 
[O]ne of the lessons that we need to learn from this catastrophic event is 
that we do need to get better about marshaling those assets and moving 
them around.  I will tell you up front, FEMA has a logistics problem, we 
have a problem understanding all the time.  I can point out where our staff 
is and I can point out where it’s supposed to go to, I can’t always tell you 
that it actually got there.125 
A massive pouring of charitable donations was also a problem for FEMA.  
Companies had difficulty coordinating with FEMA for delivery and the agency had 
difficulty integrating donations into their operations.  No system was set up to accept 
foreign financial assistance.126   
There were many complaints that FEMA reduced assistance requests from the 
states considerably.  For example, the Director of the Alabama Emergency Management 
Agency requested 100 trucks of water and 100 trucks of ice.  FEMA provided only 17 
trucks of water and 16 of ice.127  Another issue with FEMA’s lack of asset visibility came 
from the information technology system used.  FEMA uses Logistics Information 
Management System III (LIMS III) to manage inventory of supplies and equipment.  This 
system does not integrate with other FEMA information systems or any other federal, 
state, local, or private programs.  It also does not provide shipping status or delivery 
confirmations, only ordering information.128  
2. Contracting 
Awarding of contracts proved to be very problematic, especially in the first days 
after Katrina’s landfall.  80% of the $1.5 billion of contracts were awarded on a sole-
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source basis or limited competition due to pressing humanitarian needs.  The most 
worrisome are early contracts that were being executed without being written.  FEMA 
acquisition specialists verbally directed companies to start work and submit vouchers 
before any contracts were signed.  Even with DCMA and DCAA assistance, inadequate 
resources for oversight or management were available for administration of awarded 
contracts.129 
Several contracting firms raised significant concerns during the Katrina aftermath 
from problems with their contracts.  These include: 
• Liability – Concerns over environmental liabilities from pumping 
contaminated water. 
• Changing Requirements – Continually changing requirements posed 
potential funding issues, time and resource issues, and goodwill. 
• Contract Awarding – Contractors had difficulty getting actual contracts 
signed by proper officials and also slow payments from FEMA.  
Contractors turned down some contracts due to concerns of not being paid 
by FEMA, especially with subcontractors needing the quick cash flow.  
Stafford Act concerns where local businesses should be awarded contracts 
and out of region companies hired. 
• Conflicts of Interest – Companies working for both FEMA as assessors 
and then local authorities to complete the work using FEMA funds.130  
So bad were the contracting concerns and the surrounding negative publicity that 
many contractors have indicated that they will probably not conduct business with the 
federal government during future disasters simply to avoid the reputation damage, and 
costly public scrutiny.131 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Clearly, as this chapter points out, there are many issues that must be addressed 
by FEMA to improve future disaster responses.  All of these have direct or indirect 
effects on FEMA’s ability to acquire, deliver and manage the goods and services so 
crucial to response and recovery.  There also exists many idea’s, policies and 
technologies, some new and innovative and some already existing, that could be brought                                                  
129  U.S. Congress, House report, 329-330. 
130  Ibid., 331. 
131  Ibid., 337. 
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to bear to mitigate these issues.  The next chapter explores some of these, with particular 
attention on technologies or technology related policies that could improve FEMA and 
DHS acquisitions capabilities, both routine and disaster related. 
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V. EXPLORING THE ALTERNATIVES:  LEVERAGING 
AVAILABLE CONCEPTS, SYSTEMS AND TOOLS FOR 
IMPROVED ACQUISITION PROCESSES AND RAPID DISASTER 
RESPONSE 
A. OVERVIEW 
The previous chapters discussed the problems that occurred with the Federal 
Government’s response to Hurricane Katrina, with particular emphasis on DHS and 
FEMA.  In conducting research for this project, the authors found that FEMA and DHS 
are on the path to recovery with many of these areas of concern, with several initiatives 
currently in various stages of development and implementation that may prove effective 
in addressing them.  However, one area that is not addressed extensively by FEMA and 
DHS is the use of information technology to provide solutions to these concerns and to 
rapidly effect emergency contracting in future catastrophes. 
This chapter provides a brief summary of initiatives currently in place or in 
progress to address many of the identified areas of concern.  A review of emergency 
streamlined acquisition procedures is then presented, as the implementation of these 
procedures during Katrina was a subject of great concern throughout the response and 
recovery phases and the ensuing after action reviews by the administration and congress. 
The chapter then analyzes four information technology related initiatives that hold 
promise for FEMA and DHS as potential solutions to improve efficiencies in acquisition 
and contracting. 
B. FOCUSING FEMA’S FUTURE:  INITIATIVES IN PROGRESS 
Through the research conducted for this project, the authors found that FEMA, 
DHS and Congress have not only recognized many of the critical issues but have taken 
robust measures to address them.  Some of the most significant of these are listed here.  
1. Acquisition Workforce Improvement Initiatives 
Elaine Duke, the DHS Chief Acquisition Officer and Donna Jenkins, DHS 
Human Capital Strategist have spearheaded several efforts to improve the acquisition 
workforce at DHS and FEMA.  Two of these initiatives include: 
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a. DHS Fellows Program 
DHS has embarked on an ambitions recruiting program to hire 800-900 
additional personnel into their acquisition workforce.132  As part of this effort, DHS has 
created a DHS Fellows internship program to attract competitive, quality, career oriented 
college graduates into acquisition careers at DHS.  The program is a three-year internship 
that involves rotational assignments through many different organizations within DHS to 
broaden exposure and build knowledge diversity, create excitement and build flexibility 
into the individuals.  At the end of the program, which includes a two-year probationary 
period, successful candidates are eligible for direct conversion to competitive career civil 
service, bypassing the traditional competitive hiring process.  Subject to completion of 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1990 (DAWIA) level III experience 
requirements and attaining certification, individuals are then placed in General Schedule 
(GS)-13133 positions.134 
The innovative structure and career mobility incentives of the Fellows 
program has attracted interest from over 700 quality candidates from well known, highly 
respected universities (it targets top 100 ranked universities, universities within 200 miles 
of Washington, District of Columbia (DC), and historically Black, Asian and Latino 
schools) and promises to prove extremely successful in attracting motivated performers 
into the DHS Acquisition workforce.135 
b. Professional Education and Development through the Defense 
Acquisition University and the Federal Acquisition Institute 
DHS is working with the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and the 
Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI) to develop courses and a certification process for 
                                                 
132  Interview with Ms. Donna Jenkins, Department of Homeland Security Director of the Acquisition 
Workforce, (July 18, 2006). 
133  General Schedule ranges from GS-1 to GS-15 pay scales for professional Federal civilians.  GS-5 
and below are generally entry level, while GS-7 and above require additional education, experience, 
superior academic achievement or scientific research.  Movement from GS-5 to 7, or 7 to 9 (etc.), generally 
requires a minimum of one year’s experience at the previous grade to become eligible, plus any additional 
education or training requirements.  Information from the US Office of Personnel Management website, 
[http://www.opm.gov/qualifications/SEC-IV/A/GS-PROF.asp#table].  Accessed November 2006. 
134  Jenkins, DHS Acquisition Fellows and Recruitment Programs, PowerPoint Presentation, (July 18, 
2006). 
135  Ibid. 
 53
Emergency Response and Recovery to ensure deploying personnel in any capacity are 
familiar with the federal disaster response framework, including topics such as the NRP, 
the NIMS, the ICS, and contingency contracting, as well as establishing an acquisition 
professional certification process similar to the DAWIA process and developing an 
Emergency Response and Recovery Community of Practice online as part of the DAU 
Acquisition Community Connection.136 
2. Federal Disaster Response Contracting Corps  
DHS is developing a Disaster Response Contracting Corps (DRCC) similar to the 
DoD’s contingency contracting corps now being utilized in Iraq.  As part of this 
initiative, they are identifying the required skill sets, and developing certification 
programs similar to the ones already discussed above.  They are also developing the 
business rules and procedures to implement and foster the growth of the DRCC.137 
This corps would operate similarly to the DoD model, where volunteers receive 
initial and continuing training and maintain readiness to deploy as soon as a disaster 
strikes.   This initiative relies heavily upon the professional education and development 
efforts of DHS to ensure a well trained, professional, rapidly deployable strike team, 
similar to the ERTs that can immediately make a difference. 
3. Disaster Funding 
When the President uses Stafford Act authority for disaster support, the funding 
that supports and resources these efforts, comes from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF).  
This is a “no-year” revolving fund account that does not expire from year to year, similar 
to the Defense Working Capital Fund.  Congress appropriates funds as needed to keep the 
account solvent.138 
In 2005, Congress appropriated over $10 billion based on FEMA’s response to 
disasters in 2004 up until Katrina, particularly from four hurricanes during the fall of 
                                                 
136  Interview with Ms. Jenkins and DHS Acquisition Fellows and Recruitment Programs, PowerPoint 
Presentation, (July 18, 2006). 
137  Jenkins, Emergency Response and Recovery Working Group Federal Wide Collaborative 
Development: Status Update.  PowerPoint Presentation.  (July 2006). 
138  Bea, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and 
Funding, 28. 
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2004.  As of June 7, 2006, over $26 billion has been obligated in 2006 towards Katrina 
response from the DRF.  2005 appropriations into the DRF increased from the previous 
$10 billion to almost $70 billion. This revolving account allows FEMA to manage 
activities quickly with available funds vice waiting on the normally lengthy federal 
appropriations process.139   
Thus, while FEMA did have the capability that the DRF provides prior to Katrina, 
that capability has been significantly strengthened and funds are more than adequate for 
any initial response, especially for FEMA taking proactive measures to pre-position 
commodities throughout the country, pre-compete contracts and initialize mobilization 
for known potential threats.  There still remains, though, the need to address and correct 
Stafford Act restrictions on providing these funds to other federal agencies, state and 
local authorities prior to emergency or disaster declaration. 
4. Contracting, Logistics and Resources 
FEMA is working closely with GSA and DLA to ensure ready access to critical 
commodities, supplies, and services.  GSA has implemented a disaster relief portal in 
GSA Advantage to provide federal agencies access to ID/IQ contracts for disaster 
response and recovery supplies and services and GSA remains an active participant in 
FEMA interagency planning initiatives.140  FEMA has funded DLA to provide fenced 
inventory levels of critical commodities, especially MREs, at critical DLA distribution 
points throughout the country and provide means to resource other requirements through 
DLA’s acquisition channels if necessary.  FEMA has also formally partnered with DLA 
to provide a comprehensive In-Transit Visibility (ITV) capability for the movement and 
tracking of disaster relief supplies during an emergency or disaster.  DLA has also 
developed the DDX capability that will allow it to quickly deploy and set up mobile 
logistics depots, complete with material handling and mobile command, control and 
communications capabilities, in any large parking lot in or near the affected area.141 
                                                  
139  Federal Emergency Management Agency, Weekly Disaster Fund Report, (June 7, 2006). 
140  General Services Administration, GSA Advantage Disaster Relief website. 
141  LtCol Carr interview, (July 17, 2006). 
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5. Lead Agency Concept 
One of the concepts the authors originally intended to explore was the concept of 
proposing that certain federal departments or agencies with expertise in an area be 
designated as the lead agency for that mission area.  For operational and supply chain 
logistics, including acquisition and disaster relief contracting, this would be DoD.  This is 
similar to the ESF concept, with its primary and support organizations, but significantly 
more robust and thought out. 
However, the authors found via the many interviews and telephone conversations 
with personnel at FEMA and DHS that these organizations possess a strong desire to 
develop the skill sets, systems and technologies internally.  They want to greatly enhance 
their expertise and coordination capabilities so they maintain their role as the primary 
integrator for disaster response. 
6. Placement and Other Organizational Concerns 
The organizational placement and other concerns discussed in chapter IV were 
strongly heeded by Congress and action has been taken.  The Department of Homeland 
Security Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Appropriations Act, was signed into law on October 4, 
2006.142  This Act includes several key provisions aimed at strengthening FEMA and 
correcting contentious DHS reorganization moves.  These provisions should go far 
towards addressing many of the systemic problems that have plagued FEMA.  Several of 
the key provisions include: 
• Elevating FEMA to the status of an Independent Agency within DHS, 
similar to the U.S. Coast Guard and the Secret Service, 
• Elevating the Director of FEMA to the position of Chief Presidential 
Advisor for Emergency Management, 
• Restoring the preparedness function and its critical grant management 
function back under FEMA, so that the agency can more effectively work 
with state and local emergency management professionals to increase 
preparedness, 
• Strengthening capabilities on a regional level, 
• Increasing FEMA’s operating budget by 10%, and 
                                                 
142  White House, News Release: President Bush signs DHS Appropriations Act, (October 4,2006). 
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• Requiring leadership positions, including the Director to be filled by 
individuals with extensive emergency management experience.143 
C. EMERGENCY STREAMLINED ACQUISITION PROCEDURES 
Title 10 of United States Code, Section 101.A.13 sets forth what may be 
considered a declared contingency operation.  Part B of this section states that a 
contingency operation could also include a presidentially or congressionally declared 
national emergency. 144  Pursuant to the declaration of a contingency, or in the case of a 
large scale disaster such as Katrina that has been declared a national emergency, there are 
many acquisition procedures, laws and regulations that are either relaxed, supplemented 
or disregarded.145   
As of July 05, 2006, these acquisition procedures have now been consolidated 
into one section of the FAR.146  FAR part 18, a previously reserved part, now provides a 
consolidated reference of all emergency streamlined acquisition procedures contained 
throughout the FAR.  Some of the most significant procedures include: 
• Increased Micropurchase Threshold:  The micropurchase threshold during 
a declared continental U.S. (CONUS) contingency operation increases 
from $2,500 to $15,000.147  Micropurchases can be awarded without 
competition to a sole source. 
• Simplified Acquisition Procedures:  The upper threshold for using 
Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) increases from $100,000 to 
$250,000 during a declared CONUS contingency operation.148  SAP 
acquisitions are set aside, unless impracticable, for award solely to small 
businesses.149 
• Commercial Items:  The upper threshold for using the Commercial Items 
SAP test program increases from $5,500,000 to $11,000,000 during a 
                                                 
143  U.S. Congress, Press Release: FEMA Reinvention Clears Congress, (September 29, 2006). 
144  Defense Acquisition University, Contingency Contracting Student Handbook, 2-3 and Federal 
Acquisition Regulation, Part 2.101. 
145  Hurricane Katrina was declared a national emergency by President Bush on September 8, 2005, 
and thus contracting activities supporting the response utilized most every available streamlined procedure.  
Poole and Welch, Responding to Katrina: Contracting in an Emergency Situation – Ver. 2.1, 1-9. 
146  Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 18. 
147  Poole and Welch, Responding to Katrina: Contracting in an Emergency Situation – Ver. 2.1, 2. 
148  Ibid. 
149  Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 19.502-2. 
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declared CONUS contingency operation.150  This program allows the 
purchase of commercial items or services using SAP up to the greatly 
increased limits listed above. 
• Expedited Procurement Standards:  Contracting organizations can use oral 
requests for proposal, award without first advertising or synopsizing, 
waive requirements for Central Contractor Registration and Electronic 
Funds Transfer Capability, etc.151 
• Competition Requirements:  Acquisitions may be made during 
emergencies without providing for full and open competition during 
circumstances of urgent and compelling needs.  Sole source acquisitions 
can be made under these same circumstances for purchases made pursuant 
to SAP. 
Debate abounds regarding the execution of these streamlined authorities, 
especially the Katrina increase in the micropurchase threshold.  Many feel that increasing 
the micropurchase limit to $250,000 was unnecessary, hurt small businesses and that the 
strict controls that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) placed on its use placed 
undue burden on the field contracting officer.152  Others, however, strongly supported 
this flexibility and praised it as another “back pocket” tool to be used in purchasing 
situations that could mean the difference between life and death for a disaster victim.153  
Still others claim that raising the micropurchase threshold to the same $250,000 
emergency situation limit afforded SAP actually circumvented the Stafford Act.154  
Section 308 of this act directs that the spending of federal disaster relief funds give 
preference, to the maximum extent feasible, to local organizations, businesses and 
individuals in the area affected by a disaster.  Per FAR part 19, purchases made using 
SAP are to be set aside for small businesses.155  While this requirement holds true for 
SAP purchases, it does not apply to micropurchases.  Since local businesses and 
                                                 
150  Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 13.5(a). 
151  Luckey, Emergency Contracting Authorities, 5-6. 
152  Friar, Federal Contracting in Emergencies, 22. 
153  Interview with Commander Mark Goodrich, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
for Acquisition Management, (July 18, 2006).  Commander Mark Goodrich made the point that placing a 
phone call to receive permission from proper authorizing officials, as outlined in the OMB memorandum, 
represented a small price to pay and a minor inconvenience when lives and safety were on the line.   
154  Friar, 22. 
155  Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 19.502-2. 
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individuals in disaster stricken areas typically are small businesses, the claim is made that 
raising the micropurchase limit to the same limit as the SAP limit opens the possibility of 
purchases not being made from small or local businesses in providing for disaster 
response and recovery.156 
As the two examples above show, much debate does surround the use of 
streamlined contracting procedures during emergencies, especially in overwhelming 
circumstances such as Katrina.  Many other stories similar to the ones above are readily 
available.  However, the root of the problem quite possibly lies less in the streamlined 
procedures and more in the application of the procedures and, as Professor Allen Friar of 
DAU, Huntsville Alabama suggests, in the lack of trained acquisition professionals 
capable of executing them.157  In reality, these procedures, properly used, provide greatly 
enhanced capability and capacity to respond in emergency situations. 
Far from curbing the use of streamlined acquisition procedures, one suggestion to 
enhance the federal government’s ability to respond would entail including presidentially 
declared major disasters and emergencies, as defined by the Stafford Act158, in the title 
10 definition of a contingency operation, alongside declared national emergencies.  This 
suggestion, according to Rear Admiral Martin Brown, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy for Acquisition Management, would actually encourage the use of these 
procedures.159  These time critical situations would then be afforded the same standing as 
any other contingency and allow involved contracting organizations to tap the 
streamlined processes and provide a much quicker, more robust response capability.  As 




                                                 
156  Friar, 23. 
157  Ibid., 22. 
158  U.S. Congress, Stafford Act, sec. 102. 
159  Interview with Rear Admiral Martin Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Acquisition Management, (July 18, 2006). 
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legislation individually tailored to each emergency, as happened with the PL 109-62 
(Katrina Emergency Supplemental) provision that raised the micropurchase threshold to 
$250,000.160 
Increased use of emergency streamlined acquisition procedures would require 
greater oversight costs during the response and greater auditing costs during the latter 
stages of the response and during recovery efforts.  Streamlined procedures, by their 
quick and relaxed nature, are more vulnerable to abuse and to improper application due to 
time constraints and lack of training.  As with the non-emergent contracting, oversight 
and auditing are required to ensure wise use of taxpayer funds.  These vital functions 
come at a price and, during emergencies, at a premium, as far greater levels of them are 
generally required.   
Limited competition and time critical requirements also serve to quickly drive 
contract costs higher in an emergency environment.  Streamlined procedures magnify this 
effect by quickening the pace and increasing the volume of goods and services acquired 
within limited time constraints and decreased competition.  Another, possibly unintended 
cost, is a smaller base of vendors and suppliers willing to conduct business with the 
federal government for fear of being unduly audited and/or receiving negative publicity 
as a result of receiving an higher than normal price on a contract due to erroneous 
government procedures.161 
What about the benefits of emergency streamlined acquisition procedures?  Do 
they outweigh the costs?  Research conducted did not uncover any detailed studies or 
quantitative analyses suggesting either to be the case.  However, the authors put forth that 
the potential benefits in terms of saved lives and property far outweigh additional 
procurement and ensuing oversight costs.  Further, the costs, both intended and 
unintended, can be decreased and benefits, in the form of quicker response and more lives 
saved, increased through proper planning and, especially, enhanced training of the 
acquisition professionals tasked with emergency response. 
                                                 
160  Luckey, 2. 
161  U.S. Congress, House report, 337. 
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D. TELECOMMUTING / TELEWORKING 
One of the concerns for FEMA’s ability to attract highly qualified acquisition 
workforce personnel is the location of its headquarters – Washington, DC.  The nation’s 
capital is a high cost, high commute area.  The Washington, DC Metropolitan Area has 
the third longest commute in the country and also the most costly commute due to 
expensive housing near the city, excessive traffic congestion and long transit times.  
Forecasts over the next dozen years show significant increases in miles traveled with 
little road capacity increases.162 
With the high cost of living and commuting, and the extreme shortage of 
acquisition workforce personnel available, FEMA faces definite challenges in acquiring 
more personnel for headquarters and even other regional centers.  In addition, when 
disasters occur, FEMA acquisition personnel tend to work long days and weeks to 
accomplish the time sensitive needs of procurement.  This places commuting time as an 
even higher issue than without a disaster to respond to.  From the 2000 U.S. Census 
information, the National Housing Conference reported the average household spends 
40% of their total income on housing and transportation costs in the Washington, DC 
Metropolitan Area.  Households with income of less than $75,000 spend an average of 
45% – 78% of total income on housing and transportation.  This definitely adds to 
FEMA’s difficulty in attracting qualified personnel at mandated government schedule 
salaries when acquisition personnel are a highly sought after commodity due to shortages 
throughout the government and civilian sector.163 
Teleworking, the official federal moniker for telecommuting, is a concept that 
allows personnel to work from home or another non-traditional workplace other than the 
usual office place.  A recent study conducted by Intel Corporation and the research firm 
Sperling listed Washington, DC as the nation’s top Telework-friendly city due to the high 
costs, high speed internet accessibility, commuting times, fuel prices and percentage of  
 
                                                 
162  Washington Metropolitan Telework Centers website, What is Telework? 
163  National Housing Conference website, Washington, DC PMSA.  
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Telework friendly employment.  The study showed a worker Teleworking only one day 
per week would see a savings of $488 in transportation costs and a time savings of 
$2,708 per year.164 
Over the last dozen years, the Federal Government has made strides towards 
using Telework for federal civilian employees.  Public Law 108-447 in 2004 introduced 
Federal Departments and Agencies into Teleworking and later that year provided funding 
and required reporting on the status of Telework employees.  In 2000, Public Law 106-
345 began mandating all executive agencies in the Federal Government to establish 
policies on Telework, covering the entire Federal Workforce within three and a half 
years.  As of 1995, Federal Departments have the authority to use appropriated funds to 
install equipment, telephone lines and pay monthly fees in private residences for 
Telework use.165 
Telework can be a benefit for the government and government employees by 
reducing stress, reducing commute times, recruiting/retaining highly qualified personnel, 
reducing traffic congestion and pollution, and even continuity during an emergency at the 
traditional workplace location.  This form of work program is attractive to task-oriented 
professionals, such as government contracting.166  Technological barriers exist to 
Telework, but have been discovered not to be significant.  Technical support needs 
increase and a more robust Information Technology (IT) department is usually needed.  
According to Federal Telework Coordinators, acquiring the funds to procure computer 
equipment and network services has been the largest obstacle for implementing 
successful Telework programs.  From case studies, approximately half of Teleworkers 
prefer using their own personal computers and equipment, which can significantly 
decrease the cost to the agency.167   
                                                 
164  Waxer, Washington DC tops list of Telework-friendly cities, (March 30, 2006). 
165  U.S. Office of Personnel Management website, Telework laws.  
166  U.S. Office of Personnel Management, A guide to Telework in the Federal Government, (August 
3, 2006). 
167  U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Final Report on Technology Barriers to Home-Based 
Telework, (April 5, 2002). 
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The DHS published a Telework Directive in 2005 consisting of five pages mostly 
stating the governing statutes, definitions, responsibilities and very generic policies and 
procedures that does not truly provide detailed information on a successful 
implementation for Teleworking.168  OPM provides a much more in depth guide to 
Teleworking in the Federal Government, covering types of Telework (can be as little as 
one day per month or up to more than three days per week), benefits for the manager and 
worker, expectations and evaluations of the work, and detailed responsibilities of the 
manager and the worker.169 
The authors invested some time researching low-cost Telework information 
technology.  As a result of this research, the authors recommend an iMac system for ease, 
reliability, security, video teleconferencing capability, and an overall good design for 
Teleworking.  A second laptop system is also listed to provide a capability for a worker 
to deploy with the capability, not just working from a static location away from the 
office.  Both systems include a second monitor for teleconferencing, allowing the user to 
video-conference with the office while also utilizing the computer’s other screen for 
normal work.170  The system requirements and costs are listed below in Figures 8 and 9 
for the desktop iMac system and the portable laptop system. 
                                                 
168  U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  2006 Telework at the Department of Homeland Security. 
(August 17, 2005). 
169  U.S. Office of Personnel Management, A guide to Telework in the Federal Government, (August 
3, 2006). 
170  Interview with Mr. Peter Maartmann-Moe, XSLENT Technologies, (September 5, 2006). 
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Figure 8.   Apple iMac desktop system.171 
 
                                                 
171  Email from Mr. Maartmann-Moe, (September 7, 2006).  Specifications and pictures taken from 
[www.apple.com].  Accessed November 2006. 
Apple iMac 
Cost:  $2,641  
 
Features: 
Additional 20” Flat screen Cinematic Display 
2.16GHz Intel Core 2 Duo Processor 
1GB 667 DDR2 SDRAM - 2x512 
250GB Serial ATA Drive 
ATI Radeon X1600/128MB VRAM 
SuperDrive 8X (DVD+R DL/DVD±RW/CD-RW) 
Apple Keyboard & Mighty Mouse + Mac OS X (US English) 
20-inch widescreen LCD 
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Figure 9.   Dell Inspiron 9400 laptop system.172 
 
Additional costs can come from potentially higher IT support needed with 
workers at a separate location than the traditional office. 
For FEMA, Telework can be an important element in attracting much needed high 
quality, highly qualified acquisition personnel.  With the significant detractors of working 
for the agency of high costs and commute times in downtown Washington, DC or other 
large cities where regions can be based, and regulated salaries without commercial  
 
                                                 
172  Email from Mr. Maartmann-Moe, (September 7, 2006).  Specifications and pictures taken from 
[www.Dell.com].  Accessed November 2006. 
Dell Inspiron 9400 
Cost:  $2,898 
 
Features: 
2.00GHz Intel Core 2 Duo Processor 
1GB Shared Dual Channel DDR2 SDRAM at 533MHz 
120GB 5400RPM SATA Hard Drive 
Combo/DVD+RW Drives: 
8x CD/DVD burner (DVD+/-RW)  
Integrated Intel® Graphics Media Accelerator 950 
17-inch widescreen XGA+Display 
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incentives to provide above government salaried pay scales, Telework introduces a great 
incentive to attract the professional workforce that FEMA wants and needs, even if it 
requires a larger than normal initial cost investment. 
E. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL GLOBAL INFORMATION 
NETWORK ARCHITECTURE TECHNOLOGY 
The Global Information Network Architecture (GINA) represents one solution to 
the interoperability required for network-centric warfare.  As such, it also offers a prime 
solution to the challenge posed by the office of the DoD Chief Information Officer in 
September of 1999 to develop a Global Information Grid (GIG) to enable this 
connectivity.173  The challenge posed by the GIG centers around developing the 
hardware, software and IT architecture to facilitate connectivity and interoperability 
among disparate computer systems. 
The magnitude of this challenge is enormous.  The DoD has over 4200 
Management Information Systems (MIS) and other legacy business systems alone.  Each 
one developed individually for a singular purpose and with little or no means to 
interconnect with other systems.  This does not include the vast number of other 
computer systems operated by the department for war fighting, intelligence gathering, 
and other critical purposes. 
Current conventional methods of creating this connectivity would involve 
integrating all of these systems to each other individually, as depicted in Figure 10.  Each 
integration would cost approximately $1 million and take from 6 months to a year to 
complete.  Thus, this conventional integration is resource prohibitive in terms of time and 
money.174 
 
                                                 
173  Information from Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Information_Grid].  Accessed 
November 2006.  Also see Department of Defense Directive 8100.1, codifying the GIG into policy 
(September 19, 2002).   
174  $4.2 billion to the 4199th power (4200 DoD management information systems).  Burris, Utilizing 
Information Technology to Facilitate Rapid Acquisition, 47. 
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Figure 10.   Integrating management information systems.175 
 
The GIG, by contrast, seeks to integrate data in an architecture where all human 
and technology based users and providers of information can push or pull information to 
and from the GIG in a collaborative, real time environment and drastically reduce 
duplication of effort in data and information handling, reduce errors in rapid decision-
making due to limited or no interconnectivity and increase the reliability and accuracy of 
interconnected systems.176  The conceptual structure envisioned by GIG developers 
involves several layers of information technology, networks and applications, centered 
around a core of space and mobile land based, interoperable hardware, with the outer 
layer being the users and providers of data and information, be they humans, computer 
systems or weapons systems.  Figure 11 provides a graphic depiction of this concept. 
 
                                                 
175  U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-211 – Defense Acquisitions:  DOD 
Management Approach and Processes Not Well-Suited to Support Development of Global Information 
Grid, , 8. 
176  Ibid., 6. 
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Figure 11.   Depiction of the Department of Defense’s characterization of the Global 
Information Grid177 
 
Thus far, however, DoD has made little progress in bringing the GIG to reality.  
Strides have been made in creating policies, concepts and procedures and developing 
technologies that would enable the GIG, such as satellite and radio systems and in 
interoperable weapons systems such as the Army’s Future Combat System.  However, the 
myriad of management, investment, operational and technical challenges that must be 
overcome to bring this GIG envisioned integration and interoperability into reality 
remains quite complex (see table 5).  Without breakthrough technology, the GIG effort 
will prove a lengthy and very costly endeavor. 
                                                 
177  U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-04-858 – Defense Acquisitions:  The Global 




- Deciding what capabilities are affordable; what 
capabilities are unaffordable or not in line with 
DOD’s vision for the GIG, and enforcing these 
decisions among thousands of systems and across the 
military services. 
- Assuring DOD has the right representation in 
acquisition decisions. 
- Assuring management attention and oversight is 
provided to assess the overall progress of the GIG and 
determine whether it is providing a worthwhile return 
on investment, particularly in terms of enhancing and 
even transforming military operations. 
Operational 
- Deciding when, how, and how much information 
should be posted on the network and used. 
- Establishing rules to ensure the GIG can work as 
intended without reducing benefits of flexible and 
dynamic information sharing. 
- Convincing data owners of the value of sharing data 
with a broader audience and trusting the network 
enough to post data. 
Technical 
- Developing new technologies and advancing them on 
schedule. 
- Assuring common agreement on technical as well as 
information assurance standards and requirements. 
- Developing the means to protect the network and its 
data. 
 
Table 5.   Key Global Information Grid challenges.178 
 
The GINA technology offers such a breakthrough.  Developed under the auspices 
of a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) between the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) and Xslent Technologies, Inc., this technology could provide 
the foundational means for solving the GIG’s integration challenges and form the 
backbone of the entire grid. 
GINA is a network based software and hardware system that operates by defining 
certain types of information or data as an “object” to be transported between disparate 
systems.  It takes this “object” or instance of data or information and provides it for use to 
                                                 
178  U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-04-858, 19. 
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other disparate systems by means of a common definition of that object.  These common 
definitions are created as a computer system and integrated into GINA.   
During the integration process of a computer system to GINA, metadata (data 
about data) is created that defines the data in such a way that it can be recognized by any 
other system, using the common definition.  The structure of how data or information 
must be presented to the system from other systems is also defined.   
Thus, when data or information, such as a line of accounting, for example, leaves 
one system, the data is automatically tagged with the common definition for the object 
“accounting data” and routed through the GINA network to the receiving system or 
systems included on the “tag.”  At the object’s network destination, the data is structured 
into the form or format required by the receiving system, as defined in the integration 
process, and presented for use by the recipient personnel or systems.  The integration 
process of defining the system’s architecture, including all data elements using GINA 
common definitions and architecture means that a system need only be integrated once, to 
the GINA, and not to 4199 other systems (see Figure 12 below).  This brings into 
technological reality the globally interconnected network goal that is central to the GIG 
concept. 
Many benefits accrue as a result.  Cost savings estimates put the cost of 
integrating, or defining, a system to GINA using this object based structure at 10% of the 
cost of integrating system to systems using conventional computer programming to mesh 
the two systems into an integrated, interoperable and useful network arrangement.179  In 
addition, as more systems are integrated into GINA, more and more common 
relationships, structures and data objects get defined in GINA, further driving down 
integration complexity, time and costs for additional systems.180  Time savings are 
estimated to be 80%. 
                                                 
179  Burris, 47.  The Burris thesis provides an excellent resource describing, in depth the GINA and 
ROS Technology.  The ROS Technology is referred to in this work as NEPS-D. 
180  Ibid.  This thesis presents information suggesting that these costs can be driven down as low as 
2% to 3% of conventional integrations. 
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Figure 12.   Network-centric connectivity of the Global Information Grid181 
 
The GINA technology, though, remains in the developmental stages.  This is 
probably the most significant cost.  This cost being that, while it poses a significant 
solution to FEMA and DHS in automating procurement, it is not currently available for 
full scale deployment and will not be available until late 2007.  However, late 2007 is 
only 10 to 12 months away and integration efforts could start immediately to enable 
FEMA/DHS preparedness when the GINA technologies attain full operational capability.  
GINA has been fielded in several applications on an experimental basis and enjoyed 
significant success.  Examples include GINA providing the backbone to integrate base 
security operations at Ft. Leavenworth, KS, at the Integrated Base Operations Center 
(IBOC), the Naval Postgraduate School Alumni Database, and several others.182 
 
 
                                                 
181  U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-211, 8. 
182  Naval Postgraduate School, GINA website, [http://gina.nps.navy.mil].  Accessed November 2006. 
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The GINA technology, once proven and fully operational holds the potential to 
transform the U.S. military into an even more effective force.  It also holds much 
potential to transform the efficiency and effectiveness of both commercial and DoD 
business systems. 
The integration capabilities of GINA could also benefit Federal, State and Local 
disaster response operations by integrating the entire scope of the response at every level.  
Federal, State and major cities’ emergency response organizations could be integrated 
into a standing disaster coordination GINA network with the National Response 
Coordination Center (NRCC) for more effective command and control, volunteer 
resources, personnel and manpower, weather, damage assessments, intelligence, satellite 
imagery of the affected area.  Many other resources, aspects and logistics functions, 
including acquisition, could be integrated as well.  All of these functions could be linked 
to provide a common operating picture (COP) at the NRCC that could be replicable at the 
JFO on-scene and at other field sites to assist all involved and facilitate a more 
coordinated, quicker response. 
This COP concept is currently being rolled out at the Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
Integrated Base Operations Center (IBOC) and is set to become operational in January 
2007.  Figure 13 shows a picture of the IBOC’s COP display. 
 
Figure 13.   Fort Leavenworth Integrated Base Operations Center Common Operating 
Picture display.183                                                  
183  Naval Postgraduate School, GINA website. 
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Another significant potential use for the GINA technology is in online ordering.  
Utilizing GINA technology, the entire procurement chain could be integrated into one 
network to allow each functional system involved to automatically provide and receive 
critical data input related to an acquisition, from the vendor catalog or data source, to the 
contracting and inventory systems, to the accounting and other financial systems, 
including payment systems such as DoD’s Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
(DFAS).  This would allow all actions required for an acquisition to take place almost 
instantly once the request process is completed and provide rapid, real time, critical 
information to all stakeholders, especially those stakeholders required for review, 
approval and auditing.   
This online ordering capability of GINA technology, through the ROS, provides 
great potential to streamline acquisition at FEMA/DHS and to facilitate rapid ordering 
during emergencies.  An even more significant potential for GINA use in disaster 
response would be to  track all supply items from thousands of potential vendors, 
providing planners with information as to where supplies are and how long they will take 
to arrive.  And, it could be used as a data registry to track donations from non-
governmental organizations.  This process would be very similar to the process of 
tracking displaced people. 
F. RAPID ORDERING SYSTEM 
The Rapid Ordering System (ROS) is an automated data/knowledge management 
system with form filler capabilities that utilize the GINA technology.  It provides an 
information channel from the customers of a contracting office directly to the contracting 
officer so that all the effort of the customer is captured and incorporated into the 
contracting officer’s contract file on an order.  It documents the file, thereby freeing the 
contracting officer to focus on business decisions rather than administrative duties such 
as preparing memoranda for records.  It has the ability, through GINA, to integrate all 
systems required to complete a transaction, from online vendor catalogs to accounting 




effectiveness, speed, accuracy and regulatory compliance of the entire process.  Both 
ROS and GINA are technologies under development at the Naval Postgraduate School 
with the Kansas City District office of the USACE.184 
The ROS is being built as a pilot project for the Kansas City District to support 
the Corps’ emergency and construction related services.  It provides a means for 
customers and their associated contracting organizations or officers to quickly, or 
“rapidly” query thousands of approved, contracted and pre-competed ID/IQ contracts 
with vendors for required products and services.  This system is not a duplication of other 
systems such as the DOD EMALL, instead it is focused on much more difficult data 
processing requirements (if the DOD EMALL has a particular supply item already on 
contract, the ROS would query the EMALL to find it and direct the purchase to the 
EMALL).  ROS can “see” into vendors’ websites to find information about their products 
and services, thereby making that information available to the customer and the 
contracting officer, without these people having to visit each individual website. 
Utilizing GINA’s object oriented technology, ROS can automatically integrate the 
request and the associated data, or metadata (or meta-meta data), objects throughout the 
organization’s procurement, financial, configuration management, inventory management 
and any other germane systems, such as payment systems at the DFAS.  By allowing 
different legacy systems to integrate and communicate through GINA, ROS can transmit 
common data such as customer identification information, ordering information and 
accounting information as information or data objects easily recognizable by all of these 
GINA integrated systems. 
Automating this process prevents duplicative tasks typically associated with the 
current ordering process, wherein the same data is often manually re-entered into these 
disparate systems several times to complete transactions.  This greatly increases the speed 
of ordering, reduces intensive administrative labor requirements, and virtually eliminates 
the chance of human error associated with the current, somewhat manual, “hand-off” that 
must take place between these disparate legacy systems.  Automation also speeds the 
                                                 
184  Naval Postgraduate School, GINA website. 
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routing and approval process through electronic routing and progress tracking of the 
request and ensuing acquisition.  Currently, a transaction typically requires days or weeks 
(and sometimes months) to accomplish.  With ROS, the same transaction conceivably 
will now require hours or minutes, depending on the electronic review of the contracting 
officer and other review levels, approval and receipt chain of events. 
One of the greater concerns with any contracting process is adequately 
documenting the purchase, or “contract” file with all the documentation required to 
justify the purchase and the manner in which the transaction occurred.  This proves 
especially true of the competition and socio-economic compliance processes.  The ROS 
provides the capability to electronically log all actions taken on a transaction, from cradle 
to grave.  Once a customer enters all their information (which is recorded and used on all 
required forms and documents thereafter) in ROS and begins the search, or query 
process, each action taken by the customer is tagged and recorded by ROS as part of the 
electronic contract/order/requisition file.  This includes all information regarding each 
product and vendor returned as a result of the query, any price or other characteristic 
sorting and any socio-economic, geographic or other filtering.  Any sorting or filtering 
document can then be used to justify requirements for adequate market research, 
competition and compliance or utilization goals for socio-economic programs.  All of the 
captured data is then rendered into a narrative document for easy human reading. 
ROS has tremendous and wide ranging applicability to disaster relief and 
response contracting.  The capabilities of this technology provide advantages that can be 
leveraged in every aspect of the emergency management cycle, from preparedness and 
mitigation to response and recovery.  ROS is specifically designed to support USACE’s 
construction services related to hazard mitigation projects that prevent or lessen the 
effects of potential disasters.  For example, strengthening the levee system in the North 
Central California industrial agriculture complex or repairing the levee systems 
surrounding New Orleans could be accomplished through calls against ID/IQ 
construction contracts previously competed and enrolled in the ROS program.  Thus, not 
only would the acquirer of these services benefit from competition amongst contractors 
already enrolled in ROS, they will benefit from the contractor already surviving the 
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competitive process to enroll in ROS.  Enrolled vendors in ROS already have been vetted 
not only through the competitive process, but have also met all other administrative 
requirements for doing business with the federal government. 
Similarly, contractors specializing in debris removal, emergency roof repair and 
other types of repair and civil construction projects typified by the recovery phase of 
emergency management, if pre-registered in ROS, can benefit from and provide benefits 
to the Federal Government because of the speed of access provided via ROS.  FEMA, 
USACE and other organizations, possibly including state and local entities, could use 
ROS as the prime vehicle for pre-registering these local contractors before an emergency 
event, such as a hurricane, flooding or earthquake.  This would facilitate quick access to 
these services while complying with the Stafford Act preference for utilizing local 
vendors. 
Preparedness for and initial response to disasters and other emergency events, and 
the remaining phases of the emergency management cycle, could benefit tremendously 
from pre-positioning within the Corps of Engineers’ ID/IQ contracts or catalogs for the 
essential services and commodities required during an emergency event.  For example, 
vendors with catalogs or ID/IQ contracts for blankets and/or bottled water, or even the 
infamous FEMA trailers, who already have established presence in ROS could provide an 
immediate, competitive resource for rapid order fulfillment of these lifesaving 
requirements.  This same scenario could be repeated over and over for each of the 
essential services, providing a powerful asset to emergency management personnel at a 
time when speed is absolutely critical. 
In addition, requirements for other, more technical services, such as training, 
emergency maintenance, emergency communications, security, search and rescue, 
mortuary, and engineering, logistics and other technical assistance contract, as well as 
various required consulting services could be fulfilled via ID/IQ contracts already pre-
positioned within the ROS.  Within the ROS, these contract vehicles and associated 




ample information for rapid market research and provide an electronic chain of evidence 
to support the acquisition when faced with a post event audit or subjected to media 
scrutiny. 
The ability to streamline the acquisition process that ROS provides not only holds 
the potential to dramatically speed up the logistics response, but also to avoid many of the 
pitfalls, mistakes and bad press that can occur when other acquisition shortcuts, due to 
stress and time criticality, are poorly or improperly utilized. 
While sole sourcing and contracting without full and open competition are 
authorized during emergencies, the public at large often finds dissatisfaction with the 
process, as they did during the Katrina response.  The ROS capability to rapidly procure 
essential goods and services while meeting competition and socio-economic requirements 
provides a powerful tool to the responding contracting organization.  Not only are 
acquisitions conducted rapidly, saving lives and property, they are also automatically 
processed, saving money, labor and other scarce organizational resources and are also 
compliantly processed, ensuring adherence to applicable requirements without having to 
rely on often controversial emergency streamlined acquisition procedures.  The capability 
to filter by geographic region or location also facilitates compliance with the Stafford Act 
requirement for providing preference to local vendors in disaster or emergency affected 
geographic areas.185   
In the end, the ROS stands to benefit not only emergency management 
organizations such as FEMA, but also DoD organizations waging the War on Terrorism, 
the many other organizations and agencies within the DHS charged with keeping us safe 
at home, and untold number of other federal, regional, state and local organizations 




                                                 
185  U.S. Congress, Stafford Act, sec. 307. 
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G. ONLINE REVERSE AUCTIONS 
In keeping with a growing trend within the Federal Government, FEMA and DHS 
have already started to use online reverse auctions as a method of procurement for 
technology, FEMA trailer installation and other goods and services purchases.186  How, 
though, could online reverse auctions be applied in a disaster relief contracting 
environment, where rapid response is key?  This section provides a brief description of 
online reverse auctions, their positives and negatives and then explores the feasibility and 
usefulness of adopting them as a procurement tool for rapidly accessible disaster relief 
contracting. 
During a traditional forward auction, the type of auction most people tend to 
recognize, buyers compete for goods and services offered.  This causes the price of the 
good or service to increase.  A reverse auction functions directly opposite of this.  During 
a reverse auction, suppliers, contractors or vendors compete to earn the business of a 
customer procuring goods and/or services.  As they compete for this business, the intense 
competition involved drives the prices down.187  Purchasers, or their service providers, 
overwhelmingly conduct these reverse auctions online.  As such, each vendor can view 
the competition as it happens, creating immediate downward price pressure to bid even 
lower. 
Reverse auctions as a method of procurement that gained popularity during the 
mid to late 1990’s, beginning with the first offering of this service as an internet based 
electronic procurement method in 1995 by Freemarkets Incorporated.188  Since its 
inception, many reverse auction service providers, also referred to as “Market Makers” 
have entered and exited the marketplace as this method of procurement quickly caught 
on, gained popularity, became somewhat unpopular in the early 2000’s and then started 
to steadily increase again and level of as a more mature method of procurement. 
                                                 
186  Robinson, DHS moves forward with reverse auctions. 
187  Merson, Reverse Auctions: An Overview, 2-3. 
188  Now a part of Ariba, Inc. as of 2004.  Information from [http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Reverse_auction].  Accessed October 2006. 
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Prior to 1997, the FAR prohibited auctions in any form.  However, during that 
year, FAR part 15 was re-written and prohibitions against auctions were eliminated, 
opening the door for reverse auction use within the Federal Government.189  In 2000, 
after successfully surviving the year 2000 (Y2K) millennia computer hurdle, many 
federal agencies began to experiment with reverse auctions.  The first reverse auction 
within DoD was conducted on May 5, 2000 by Naval Inventory Control Point, 
Mechanicsburg to purchase circuit cards for ejection seats.190  Since that time, use within 
DoD and the Federal government has steadily increased. 
Research conducted suggests that utilizing reverse auctions provides many 
benefits.  Five of these benefits have direct applicability to disaster relief contracting.  
First, these auctions attract far more suppliers (or bidders) than traditional procurement 
methods and the actual event spurs spirited price competition.191  Second, this 
competition results in significant initial price reductions ranging from 10% to 40%.  With 
repeated use, these reductions diminish or disappear, but the auctions hold prices closer 
to true market value.192  Third, the automation of the procurement cycle created by online 
reverse auctions, particularly the bidding and negotiation process, can reduce acquisition 
cycle times by around 40%.193  Fourth, online reverse auctions are best suited for 
commodity type goods and standardized services.194  Commodities and standardized 
services are the most critical items required for rapid, effective disaster response.  Finally, 
online reverse auctions improve the “reach” of a buyer,195 allowing them access to a 
much wider supplier base of large and small businesses, resulting particularly from the  
 
                                                 
189  Merson, 11. 
190  Ibid., 8. 
191  Guillemaud, et.al, Reverse Auction Case Studies:  Effectively and Ethically Lowering Supply 
Chain Costs, 1. 
192  Beall, et al., The role of reverse auctions in Strategic Sourcing, 11. 
193  Beall, et al., The role of reverse auctions in Strategic Sourcing, 8. 
194  Ibid., 8-10. 
195  Beall, et al., 8. 
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ease of use and participation that accompanies reverse auctions.196  Though all of these 
positive attributes are directly applicable to disaster relief contracting, this last one could 
prove the most beneficial. 
Much of the research and literature, however, also points to some very serious 
concerns with reverse auctions.  One consistent concern is that reverse auctions eat away 
at supplier profits by driving prices down below cost, causing suppliers to lose money 
and, in some cases, go out of business.197  Another consistent assertion is that the 
downward pressure on profits created by online reverse auctions negatively impacts 
supplier-buyer relations, creating an atmosphere of distrust as suppliers often feel coerced 
into participating.198  Additionally, in order for suppliers to overcome the “winner’s 
curse”199 and realize any profit, or at least decrease the loss, they often must provide 
lower service levels and cheaper quality products.200  These specific issues, along with a 
host of ethical concerns, must be addressed thoroughly for online reverse auctions to have 
any practical use as a disaster relief contracting method. 
Though reverse auctions can be implemented via several methods, including, 
email, telephone, fax or bulletin board systems, they are conducted overwhelmingly with 
the online and web based methods.   Through a review of reverse auction literature, the 
assumption can be made that instances where the online or web-based approaches are not 
used are extremely rare.  Conducting reverse auctions via the internet allows a certain 
level of equal access opportunity, fairness, transparency, information security and even-
handed treatment that cannot be guaranteed by the other methods and, as the lessons from 
Katrina have revealed, each of these points are key issues that are of utmost importance 
to rapid response disaster relief contracting. 
                                                 
196  Persons, Competing for Contracts Through Online Reverse Auctions, 13-15. 
197  Tassabehji, et al., Reverse Auctions and Supplier/Buyer relationships: An Exploratory Study, 168. 
198  Hartley, et al., Exploring the barriers to the adoption of e-auctions for sourcing, 209. 
199  Tassabehji, et al., 169. 
200  Hartley, et al., 204-206. 
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During the actual conduct of the reverse auction, information on prices and 
suppliers can be open, closed or scaled.201  In an open auction, each vendor’s name and 
current bid price is displayed, not only creating intense competition, but also allowing all 
suppliers to conduct market surveillance.  For a closed auction, a competing supplier only 
knows whether he is LEAD (has the current lowest bid or LAG (does not have the current 
lowest bid).202  Scaled auctions are hybrids of open and closed.  The prices could be 
shown, but the names of the competing firms masked, or the rank of each supplier (as 
identified by name or by assigned identification) could be shown but only the current low 
bid displayed.  The many variations that exist can be tailored by FEMA to meet the 
comfort level of the participating buyer and (pre-qualified) suppliers. 
Two types of internet based methods exist.  Self-service software allows 
companies to conduct online procurements in-house and avoid the fees charged by third 
party providers.  However, many companies prefer the second method.  This involves 
enlisting the services of third party providers, or “market makers,” such as Fedbid (a 
provider catering to federal agencies) or Ariba.  These firms not only provide an 
enhanced level of service, continuity and standardization, but allow access by smaller 
buyer and seller organizations that do not possess robust information technology 
capabilities.  They also provide many value added services required by the pre-
solicitation process, such as market research, supplier registration and pre-qualification 
and many others.  Many of these third party providers can even tailor purchases to be 
offered to specific suppliers meeting certain criteria, such as meeting FAR required 
socio-economic goals.203   
One concern by small businesses that could affect this idea revolves around 
competing bid prices and the current low bid price being masked during closed reverse 
auctions.204  They contend that this closed, lead/lag bidding does not provide them with 
the data they need to make an educated guess about what their next bid should be, or if 
                                                 
201  Patel, Establishing Mutual Equity for Buyers & Sellers with E-Sourcing, 20-21. 
202  Robinson, DHS moves forward with reverse auctions. 
203  Persons, 14. 
204  Varney, Trailer Contract Process Draws Fire, (August 14, 2006). 
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they should even consider bidding at all.  Thus, FEMA and the provider might need to 
ensure that some form of open or scaled auction process be used to provide these small, 
often inexperienced, businesses with the information needed to make an educated bid 
decision that does not negatively affect their financial status.   
The ease of use for small suppliers and this ability to tailor the online reverse 
auctions to specific suppliers could be used to direct emergency disaster relief 
procurements to local small business suppliers and vendors located within a disaster 
affected area, in support of the Stafford Act requirement for this preference.205  In an 
interview with Dee Lee, the Chief Acquisitions Officer at FEMA, she stated that one of 
the greatest challenges to this and many other initiatives to reach out to local vendors is 
that of “pre-positioning” the buying process.206  In other words, how can FEMA go about 
publicizing such a capability to ensure the widest opportunity for small businesses to pre-
register?   
Through entering into a partnership with one of these third party providers, 
FEMA could engage them to market and manage this pre-registration and pre-
qualification process to small businesses throughout the nation capable of providing the 
required emergency commodities and services, with particular attention paid to high risk 
regions prone to large scale disaster events such as hurricanes, flooding, or earthquakes.  
FEMA could also advertise this capability via press releases, via its website and through 
other federal, state, regional and local emergency response organizations and related 
associations, as well as through Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) such as 
AMCROSS.  The provider could also manage, or subcontract, the training process to 
ensure these businesses know how and when to participate in this process during a 
disaster event in their area. 
When an event occurred, FEMA and the provider would be able to almost 
immediately turn this capability into a solid, equitable, competed, and rapid contracting 
mechanism.  The reverse auctioning events could even be structured such that all 
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participating vendors with capability and willingness could perform, with the price being 
paid resulting from some average of the lowest three to five bids, or some other equitable 
formula. 
The online reverse auction process, if structured and managed effectively, 
possesses much potential as a rapid disaster relief and response contracting initiative.  
Though this project briefly touches on its advantage as one of several proposed idea in a 
suite of initiatives, it bears further consideration and investigation by emergency 
management professionals at all levels:  State, Regional and Federal. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed current processes and new initiatives at FEMA and DHS 
that are providing for marked progress in addressing acquisition process shortfalls 
brought to light in the aftermath of Katrina.  A healthy reminder of current streamlined 
acquisition procedures, policies, and regulations was also provided.  Though already in 
existence, these procedures were either misused or remained untapped during the Katrina 
response and efforts should be made to ensure those acquisition professionals charged 
with responding to the next disaster are well educated, trained and drilled in their proper 
use. 
Finally, the chapter analyzed one existing acquisition technology, two 
developmental technologies, and one technology based human capital policy, all of which 
have potential application to disaster relief acquisition and contracting.  If implemented 
proactively, all of them hold promise to improve acquisition processes and enable rapid 
disaster relief contracting at FEMA and DHS. 
Chapter VI presents an attribute analysis of these four potential initiatives to 
identify which to implement first and in what priority order to implement the others. 
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VI. ANALYZING AND PRIORITIZING THE ALTERNATIVES 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter analyzes the various technological initiatives discussed in the 
previous chapter that can improve FEMA’s acquisition workforce.  Each of these 
initiatives can serve FEMA by a variety of benefits.  The analysis views each of the 
attributes for each initiative and provides a weighted rating for several criteria.  The 
ratings are converted into scores, depending on the value of the particular criteria and 
sub-factors.  Each initiative will have a total score showing the amount of utility it could 
benefit FEMA’s acquisition division in the future if the initiative is implemented 
successfully. 
This analysis uses an alternative-focused thinking approach to select an initiative 
that should provide the greatest value to FEMA’s acquisition division.  Alternative-
focused is a multiple attribute utility model that uses a mathematical technique to analyze 
options that could seem very subjective in nature.207  The model is used to assign 
priorities of need to evaluate each initiative based on the priorities found during the 
research.  Five general areas are used for evaluation, each contributing to the potential for 
improving an area that FEMA faced problems with during contracting in the response to 
Hurricane Katrina. 
The attribute-focused thinking model provides a percentage value attributed to 
each of the evaluating criteria.  The five initiatives receive a score for every criterion and 
then the percentage value attributed to each criterion is multiplied by the score to receive 
an overall score for the criteria.  All of the criteria scores for the initiative are then 
summed to provide the total score for the initiative.  The initiative receiving the highest 
score provides insight as the most valued initiative to combat FEMA’s problems in 
contracting during the Hurricane Katrina response. 
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B. DESIGN SCHEMA 
The attribute-focused thinking model requires five steps for the analysis.  First, 
the problem must be recognized and potential solutions researched.  The authors focused 
on technology initiatives that could help FEMA with future disaster relief and response 
acquisitions.  Second, the model requires specifying values to conduct the attribute 
analysis.  The authors developed a set of criteria based on research into FEMA’s 
acquisition and contracting problems encountered during the Katrina response.  These 
criteria were selected on capabilities that will improve areas of FEMA acquisition 
discovered through this research, as discussed in previous chapters. 
The third element of the model requires alternatives for the solution.  The authors 
used four technology initiatives listed in the previous chapter as viable options for FEMA 
to pursue.  Fourth, the alternatives must be evaluated.  This analysis used a weighted 
approach, placing the importance of each of the criterion and how much each initiative 
would benefit the specific criterion.  The authors developed the weighting based on the 
expected importance and need for FEMA for the particular criterion.  Fifth, an alternative 
is selected.  The weighted scoring system provided an overall score for each initiative.208 
The four technology initiatives evaluated were described in the last chapter.  Each 
initiative is given scores for several criteria on the basis of their ability to improve 














Table 6.   Initiatives for weighted analysis. 
 
Each criterion will receive a score between zero and five in the capabilities, and 
then each capability will gain a sum total of each of the scores.  These scores will then be 
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multiplied by the percentage given to the value of the individual criteria providing a 
graded rating for the criteria.  Higher ratings signify more potential value added that 
could be received by FEMA by implementing the initiative.  Table 7 lists the amount of 
potential benefit FEMA could receive with the corresponding score. 
 
Scoring System
0 - Not effective at all
1 - Some effectiveness
2 - Moderate effectiveness
3 - Effective
4 - Definite improvements
5 - Exceptional improvements  
Table 7.   Scoring system for weighted analysis. 
 
The five criteria evaluated are the capabilities discovered during research to be the 
most needed for FEMA to combat future problems with the acquisition process and 
future contracting responses during catastrophic disasters.  Table 8 lists the criteria. 
 
Criteria
Ability to improve the acquisition workforce
Ability to increase procurement efficiency
Ability to increase compliance to regulations
Ability to increase coordination with other activities
Ability to improve competition in contracting  
Table 8.   Criteria used for weighted analysis. 
 
The evaluated capabilities, the weightings, and the scoring conducted for this 
analysis are subjective judgments based on the authors’ research into the Federal 
Government’s acquisition and contracting response to the Hurricane Katrina national 
disaster. 
C. ATTRIBUTE ANALYSIS 
The ability to improve the acquisition workforce is the first criteria analyzed and 
has been determined through the authors’ research to be one of the most important 
characteristic facing FEMA’s ability to improve future responses.  The criterion contains 
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three sub-factors that are evaluated:  1) education and professionalism of the workforce, 
2) acquiring and retaining quality workers, and 3) the efficiency of the workforce.  Each 
of the subsets has been given 10% to 15% weighting to the overall analysis, for a total 
weighting of this criteria of 35%.  Table 9 displays the weighting for the first criteria. 
 
Total 35%
Education of workers 10%









Table 9.   Weighting for the ability to improve the acquisition workforce. 
 
The second criterion analyzed is the ability to increase procurement efficiency for 
FEMA’s acquisition division.  The sub-factors include: 1) increasing the amount of 
written contracts, 2) decreasing the amount of time to award a contract, 3) delegating 
buying power, and 4) increasing the visibility of all contract actions.  FEMA faced 
problems during Katrina with the number of contracts and the inability to complete 
contract actions in a reasonable time.  Increased efficiency can also be realized by 
decreasing the time it takes a contracting specialist to award a contract, by delegating 
buying power to another entity, thereby freeing up FEMA contracting specialists for 
other work or also increasing the visibility of contract actions with technology to reduce 
the amount of administration time FEMA must use for contract surveillance.   
Each of the sub-factors received an equal weighting of 5%.  The overall weighting 
received a value of 20%.  Table 10 displays the weighting for the second criteria. 
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Total 20%
Increase the amount 
of written contracts 5%
Decrease the amount 
of time to award 5%
Delegating buying 
power 5%
Improved visibility of 
all contract actions 5%
Criteria Weighting Factor




Table 10.   Weighting for the ability to increase procurement efficiency. 
 
The third criterion addressed the ability to increase compliance to regulations.  
During the Katrina response, FEMA received continued criticism and news coverage for 
awarding contracts without adhering to the FAR or the competition and local business 
clauses in the Stafford Act.  The ability to comply with the FAR and other statutes sub-
factors received a value of 5% while the Stafford Act compliance received 10%.  The 
overall weighting given to this criterion comes to 15%.  Table 11 displays the weighting 
for the third criteria. 
 
Total 15%








Table 11.   Weighting for the ability to increase compliance to regulations. 
 
The fourth criterion evaluated each initiative for its ability to increase 
coordination with other activities.  FEMA faced many problems with the lack of visibility 
of resources that were contracted by other activities, which in turn made all entities 
fighting for the same resources without coordination and created a lot of false 
competition.  Improving visibility of the resourcing actions of all stakeholders (state and 
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local governments, commercial entities, federal agencies/departments and private 
organizations) received the value of 10%, which was the total for this criterion.  Table 12 
displays the weighting for the fourth criteria. 
 
Total 10%
Visibility of all 








Table 12.   Weighting for the ability to increase coordination with other activities. 
 
The last criterion evaluated was the ability to improve competition in contracting 
for FEMA.  Improved ability to provide better competition is a federal priority, giving 
this criterion an overall value of 20%.  Some of the sub-factors that promote improved 
competition are decreasing the number of sole source awards (given the value of 5%), 
increasing the number of pre-award ID/IQ contracts allowing firms to compete before a 
disaster occurs (value of 5%), and the ability to reduce the number of high risk contracts 
(value of 10%).  Table 13 displays the weighting for the last criteria. 
 
Total 20%
Decrease the number 
of sole source awards 5%
Increase the number 
of pre-award IDIQ 
contracts
5%
Ability to decrease the 








Table 13.   Weighting for the ability to improve competition in contracting. 
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Table 14 below lists the ratings assigned to each of the initiatives for the first 
criteria.  The Rapid Ordering System (ROS) and the Global Information Network 
Architecture (GINA) each received a score of (1), providing some additional 
effectiveness to the education of the workforce since the systems slightly improve 
workforce knowledge by increasing the visibility and potential number of orders that can 
be managed.  Telework received a score of (2).  The ability and motivation of the 
individual worker completely provides the amount of education the employee achieves, 
but the likelihood is moderate that the employees will become better educated by 
motivating themselves when working more independently.  Online reverse auctions 
(ORA) received the highest score of (3) since the knowledge and education gained from 
continued use of ORA has shown to force an increase in worker knowledge. 
For acquiring and retaining quality workers, GINA received a (1) since it provides 
only potentially slight benefit for retaining workers.  It is a common operation picture 
(COP) that provides better vision of contracts that can benefit less in the quality of 
workers, but focuses more on the ability to manage.  When used with ROS, the benefit 
would be significantly enhanced.  ORA and ROS received ratings of (2) for enhancing 
productivity and therefore provide the moderate effectiveness.  Telework received the 
highest score of (5) for exceptionally increasing the ability to retain quality workers.  
Without the ability for other monetary compensation incentives, Telework has the 
potential of significantly increasing the morale of the best qualified personnel 
(particularly in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area). 
All of the initiatives will significantly increase the efficiency of the workforce.  
Both Telework and GINA received a (4) for increasing employee morale and the ability 
to retain highly qualified personnel and for increasing the ability to manage all contract 
actions respectively.  ORA and ROS received a (5) for their ability to increase the amount 













Rating Rating Rating Rating
Education of workers 3 1 2 1
Acquiring and retain 
quality workers 2 2 5 1
Efficiency of 
workforce 5 5 4 4
Criteria




Table 14.   Ratings for the ability to improve the acquisition workforce. 
 
For the second criteria, the ability to increase procurement efficiency, ROS 
received the highest rating of (5) in three of the four sub-factors, with a (4) in the 
improved visibility of all contract actions.  Due to the design of ROS, it provides the 
greatest benefit in the number of contracts that can be written and limiting the time to 
award.  It also completely allows a delegation of buying power by providing simple 
procedures for other activities to order through a very efficient process.  ROS also allows 
a definite improvement in the visibility of contract actions, especially when integrated 
with GINA. 
ORA received (4) in three areas and a (3) in improved visibility of contract 
actions.  ORA allow a more efficient procurement process than historical bidding 
processes.  This increases the number of contracts that can be written by an equal number 
of employees while decreasing the time to award using full and open competition.  As 
well, buying power can be delegated to contract specialists much more easily using this 
process. 
Since GINA is an architecture, it can provide better information that can assist 
workers to increase the number of contracts, decrease the time to award and allow senior 
leadership visibility of more information that can make them more comfortable with 
delegating buying power.  This initiative received a (3), (2) and (3) respectively on the  
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first three sub-factors.  GINA provides exceptional visibility on contract actions by 
providing full information as needed by management.  The initiative received a (5) for 
the fourth sub-factor. 
Telework generally provides an opportunity to increase employee morale and free 
up commuting time for the employee.  A more comfortable working environment can 
very well make the employee more productive for the first two sub-factors, but this 
completely depends on the employee’s personal motivation.  For these reasons, Telework 
received a (2), (3) and (1) for the first three sub-factors.  Telework does not provide any 
improvement for the visibility of contract actions, therefore receiving a (0) in the last sub-













Rating Rating Rating Rating
Increase the amount 
of written contracts 4 5 2 3
Decrease the amount 
of time to award 4 5 3 2
Delegating buying 
power 4 5 1 3
Improved visibility of 
all contract actions 3 4 0 5





Table 15.   Ratings for the ability to increase procurement efficiency. 
 
The third criterion, the ability to increase compliance to regulations does not 
receive any noticeable benefit from GINA, therefore receiving a (0) in both sub-factors.  
Telework does not provide any benefit except for Congressional mandates for Federal 
Agencies and departments to implement Telework into the Federal Civilian Workforce.  
For this, Telework received a (1) for other statutes and a (0) for the Stafford Act. 
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Both ORA and ROS received a (5) for Stafford Act compliance since they both 
provide potentially exceptional capabilities to increase (and manipulate as necessary) 
competition, promoting socio-economic policies by tailoring bids and contracts to small, 
local or disadvantaged businesses.  ORA received a (4) for FAR compliance due to the 
amount of professionalism and objectivity required from the acquisition workforce when 
implementing this initiative.  ROS received a (3) for FAR compliance due to the 
innovative and great potential to achieve many different results. The rating has the 
potential for a higher score, but due to the limited case law on ROS, the initiative may be 













Rating Rating Rating Rating
FAR and other 
statutes 4 3 1 0
Stafford Act 5 5 0 0





Table 16.   Ratings for the ability to increase compliance to regulations. 
 
For the fourth criteria, the ability to increase coordination with other activities and 
the visibility the initiatives can give FEMA or the resourcing actions from all activities, 
agencies and other stakeholders, GINA leads the way.  This initiative provides the 
potential for true visibility through many different acquisition systems to allow FEMA to 
manage and gain visibility of all contracting actions.  The activities being resourced will 
help FEMA make better decisions as needed for acquisition and contracting.  GINA 
received the highest score of (5).  Telework received a (0) since it does not provide any 




ORA and ROS both received a score of (3) since they both provide a 
technological feed for potentially enhancing the visibility for FEMA and other activities 














Rating Rating Rating Rating
Ability to increase 
coordination with 
other activities
Visibility of all 
resourcing actions of 
stakeholders
3 3 0 5
Criteria
 
Table 17.   Ratings for the ability to increase coordination with other activities. 
 
For the fifth and last initiative of the ability to improve competition in contracting, 
ROS received a (5) for all three sub-factors, decreasing the number of sole source awards, 
increasing the number of pre-award ID/IQ contracts and the ability to decrease the 
number of high risk contracts.  This initiative gives exceptional effectiveness on all 
factors.  By its very nature, pre-award ID/IQ contracts can be set in place before the 
contingency takes place.  Items can be competed and contracts can be set in place by 
small, local and disadvantaged business, but also expanded to other geographical areas if 
dictated by the emergency.  Since contracts are set in place before an emergency, high 
risk contracts are avoided. 
ORA is an open competition sourcing process, thereby eliminating sole source 
awards and decreasing the potential of high risk contracts.  ORA received a (5) for both 
of these sub-factors.  Pre-award ID/IQ contracts could be used by a reverse auction and 
pre-bid; this initiative received a rating of (3) for the second sub-factor.  GINA does not 
provide an ability to increase ID/IQ contracts (receiving a (0) for that sub-factor), but 
provides better visibility for management, thereby decreasing the amount of high risk 
contracts, receiving a (4).  As a COP, GINA received a rating of (3) for decreasing the 
number of sole source awards by giving management more information for the decision 













Rating Rating Rating Rating
Decrease the number 
of sole source awards 5 5 1 3
Increase the number 
of pre-award IDIQ 
contracts
3 5 0 0
Ability to decrease the 
number of high risk 
contracts
5 5 3 4





Table 18.   Ratings for the ability to improve competition in contracting. 
 
D. PRIORITIZING THE INITIATIVES 
Utilizing each of these ratings for the four initiatives, the weight given to each 
sub-factor is multiplied by the rating the initiative received.  This provides the score for 
the individual sub-factors.  Each sub-factor score for the initiative is added to provide the 
overall score for the criteria for the initiatives.  The scores for all criteria are summed for 
the initiative, providing the overall score for the initiative.  Table 19 provides the scores 










Score Score Score Score
Ability to improve the 
acquisition workforce 1.1 0.9 1.35 0.65
Ability to increase procurement 
efficiency 0.75 0.95 0.3 0.65
Ability to increase compliance to 
regulations 0.7 0.65 0.05 0
Ability to increase coordination 
with other activities 0.3 0.3 0 0.5
Ability to improve competition in 
contracting 0.9 1 0.35 0.55
Totals 3.75 3.80 2.05 2.35
Criteria
 
Table 19.   Total scores for the initiatives. 
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The ROS received the highest score of 3.80, signifying the average effectiveness 
for the initiative as providing definite improvements to FEMA’s acquisition workforce 
issues.  ORA came in at a score of 3.75, barely behind the ROS score, signifying the 
initiative practically as equally effective as implementing ROS, if not more so, since it is 
current technology.  ROS, though very nearing completion in Winter 2007, is still in the 
developmental phase.209  GINA and Telework received scores of 2.35 and 2.05 
respectively, showing at least moderate effectiveness in addressing FEMA’s procurement 
problems.  Table 20 provides a detailed description of all ratings and scorings for the sub-
factors and totals on each criteria and initiative. 
                                                 
209  Naval Postgraduate School, GINA website. 
 96
Rating Score Rating Score Rating Score Rating Score
Total 35% 1.1 0.9 1.35 0.65
Education of workers 10% 3 0.3 1 0.1 2 0.2 1 0.1
Acquiring and retain 
quality workers 15% 2 0.3 2 0.3 5 0.75 1 0.15
Efficiency of 
workforce 10% 5 0.5 5 0.5 4 0.4 4 0.4
Total 20% 0.75 0.95 0.3 0.65
Increase the amount 
of written contracts 5% 4 0.2 5 0.25 2 0.1 3 0.15
Decrease the amount 
of time to award 5% 4 0.2 5 0.25 3 0.15 2 0.1
Delegating buying 
power 5% 4 0.2 5 0.25 1 0.05 3 0.15
Improved visibility of 
all contract actions 5% 3 0.15 4 0.2 0 0 5 0.25
Total 15% 0.7 0.65 0.05 0
FAR and other 
statutes 5% 4 0.2 3 0.15 1 0.05 0 0
Stafford Act 10% 5 0.5 5 0.5 0 0 0 0
Total 10% 0.3 0.3 0 0.5
Visibility of all 
resourcing actions of 
stakeholders
10% 3 0.3 3 0.3 0 0 5 0.5
Total 20% 0.9 1 0.35 0.55
Decrease the number 
of sole source awards 5% 5 0.25 5 0.25 1 0.05 3 0.15
Increase the number 
of pre-award IDIQ 
contracts
5% 3 0.15 5 0.25 0 0 0 0
Ability to decrease the 
number of high risk 
contracts
10% 5 0.5 5 0.5 3 0.3 4 0.4













Ability to improve 
the acquisition 
workforce
Ability to increase 
procurement 
efficiency
Ability to increase 
compliance to 
regulations








Table 20.   Summary of ratings and scores for all initiatives. 
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The weighted analysis approach allows an analysis of several already potentially 
positive initiatives and a capability for discerning which of the options brings the most 
potent benefit to an organization.  FEMA’s acquisition division faced several problems 
during the Katrina response due to several factors emanating from political history and  
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general make up of the organization.  The analysis provided a rank order of the four 
technology initiatives to show which option provides the most potential benefit to solving 
most of the problems. 
Although the ROS scored the highest of the four initiatives, ORA scored almost 
the same high score at just .05 points behind.  GINA and Telework received significantly 
lower scores, but still hold substantial potential towards improving FEMA’s acquisition 












Table 21.   Total weighted scores for the initiatives. 
 
The results of the analysis will be used in the next chapter to provide conclusions 
and recommendations that will hopefully provide a future direction for technological 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What Alternatives are Available to Improve FEMA’s Acquisition 
Processes for Rapid Reaction to Large Scale Disasters within the 
United States? 
Many alternatives are available to bring improvement to FEMA’s acquisition 
processes, both during normal, pre-disaster, operations and during emergency response 
operations post-disaster.  These alternatives not only address the surface issues, but reach 
through to many of the underlying causes for inadequate response.  The Agency is 
pursuing several options that hold promise to address these systemic concerns.  Several 
technological solutions are also available that could measurably improve the Agency’s, 
and the entire Federal Government’s response. 
2. What Factors Hindered the Federal Government's Response to 
Hurricane Katrina, Including the Acquisition Response? 
Many factors hindered the federal response to Katrina.  Overall, though, 
leadership competency, organizational placement and stakeholder management issues 
created the greatest shortfalls.  In addition, concerns regarding FEMA’s placement within 
DHS and the removal of preparedness functions from FEMA left the agency without the 
power to influence the state of preparedness at the State and Local level.  As a result, the 
agency’s ability to act on the latter three elements of the emergency management cycle, 
response, recover and mitigation languished.  The DHS laser focus on terrorism 
prevention and response also diminished the federal governments, and the nations, ability 
to respond to natural disasters.   
The drain of other resources, especially funding levels and personnel, from 
federal disaster preparedness, especially at FEMA, had a ripple effect that cascaded 
throughout the organization.  Decreased funding meant no training, or equipping, of 
ERTs.  It also meant no resources devoted to planning and preparation efforts.  Resource, 
or commodity management, along with other supply chain issues, suffered as well.  At 
the time Katrina hit, FEMA was badly in need of a much more modernized supply chain  
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apparatus, one that included electronic, automated acquisition and contracting processes, 
total asset visibility supply management and transportation solutions and operational 
logistics capabilities, but they did not have the funding. 
Lack of funds also decreased hiring authority.  As many seasoned emergency 
response professionals became frustrated with the lack of resources and moved on, or just 
retired, there were no funds to replace them.  Those that did stay became increasingly 
exasperated and overworked.  This hit the acquisition workforce at FEMA especially 
hard.  When Katrina hit, there were not enough contracting specialists to meet the 
demands of the disaster.  Those that were available suffered from poor equipping, 
training and career management and were quickly overwhelmed.  As a result, FEMA 
started to cut corners with regards to acquisition procedures and regulations just to buy 
the stuff fast enough to save lives. 
3. What Acquisition and Contracting Concepts, Systems, Tools, and 
Technologies are Available that Could Be Leveraged for Rapid 
Response to Future Disasters? 
FEMA, with the help of Congress, is pursuing several initiatives to address and 
improve their response capability.  These include acquisition workforce initiatives such 
as professional certification and education and an innovative internship program; 
contingency contracting initiatives to create a disaster response contracting corps capable 
of a rapid, effective and responsible response; funding initiatives to ensure adequate 
disaster funding and operational funding; and initiatives to place FEMA in an 
organizational position within DHS that elevates the agency’s power to lead and 
increases the response resources available.   
There remains, however, room for improvement in integrating technological 
solutions to increase command and control and operational awareness, refine acquisition 
processes and speed up emergency response disaster relief contracting.  As this project 
outlines, four promising technological solutions that warrant further research by FEMA 
include utilizing ORAs and providers, implementing the ROS, utilizing GINA and 
adopting Telework, or telecommuting as a strategic human capital tool. 
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4. Which Technological Initiatives Should FEMA Pursue to Improve the 
Acquisition Process? 
FEMA should pursue all four technological initiatives:  online reverse auctions, 
ROS, GINA and Telework.  However, the benefits each provides, the issues each 
addresses and the urgency of the capability provided should dictate the precedence given 
to each and the order in which each is implemented.   
Based on an attribute analysis conducted by the authors, FEMA should pursue 
ORAs and the ROS technologies first.  Second, the agency should pursue using the GINA 
technology to improve operational and acquisition command and control.  Finally, the 
agency should fully implement Congressional Telework mandates to attract greater 
numbers of more highly qualified acquisition professionals. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
According to Deidre Lee, the recently appointed (March 2006) Chief Acquisition 
Officer at FEMA, the agency’s acquisition apparatus, including the workforce, needs to 
be dragged kicking and screaming into the 21st century.210  The organization is working 
diligently to learn the lessons of Katrina and is making great strides on several fronts, due 
in no small part to Ms. Lee’s leadership.  In addition to these efforts, here are some 
recommendations that may further assist the agency in meeting these challenges. 
1. Utilize Online Reverse Auction Providers as One Method for Pre-
Positioning the Disaster Response Acquisition Process 
FEMA should very quickly engage an ORA provider to begin the process of pre-
positioning the buying process in high disaster hazard areas, especially the hurricane 
prone areas of the Gulf and East Coast and the earthquake prone areas of the West Coast.   
The agency could enter into a technical support contract with an online reverse 
auction service provider to market agency needs then identify, pre-register and train local 
vendors on this online bidding technology.  When a disaster occurred, the service 
provider could filter for local preference and vendor type/capability, provide a list of 
local vendors capable of meeting stated requirements and assist in conducting the auction 
and follow-on acquisition processes. 
                                                 
210  Interview with Ms. Deirdre Lee, FEMA Chief Acquisition Officer, (July 18, 2006). 
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This could provide the capability to reach out to local businesses, in compliance 
with the Stafford Act, and provide a relatively user-friendly and easily accessible source 
for smaller businesses to immediately participate in the response and recovery, including 
the economic recovery.  The award process within the actual reverse auction event could 
be structured so that all responsible and capable bidders necessary to fulfill the 
requirement, starting from the lowest bidder and working up the list would receive 
orders, based on an average price or some other equitable formula.   In doing this, then 
many smaller local businesses could make up the aggregate need with low transportation 
costs or time and the economic recovery effect of federal disaster response outlays could 
benefit those that need it most. 
2. Research Feasibility of Utilizing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
Rapid Ordering System Technology and “Virtual Storefront” as a 
Resource for Rapid Disaster Response Acquisition 
Pre-positioning the buying process prior to a disaster strike using a combination 
of online reverse auction and ROS technologies would greatly improve rapid 
procurement response capabilities while addressing Stafford Act compliance issues.  The 
ROS technology could automate access to multiple award schedules indefinite delivery, 
indefinite quantity (MAIDIQ) contracting vehicles for supplies and services and do so in 
a manner that filters for local vendor preference, creates an electronic track record for 
complete transparency, and ensures fairness through presenting multiple competitive 
bids.211 
The technology and the actual system (the ROS) remain under development by 
USACE and NPS, with an anticipated go-live date of January 2007.  The Corps will 
operate and host the ROS, as well as continue to build, improve and populate the system 
with contracted vendors.  FEMA would need to enter into a cooperative agreement with 
the Corps to gain access to the ROS and ensure the ROS geographical and socio-
economic sorting capabilities, as well development of the supplier base, are robust 
enough to provide usefulness and viability as an acquisition pre-positioning tool. 
                                                 
211  Drabkin and Thai, Emergency Contracting in the US Federal Government, 94-97. 
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3. Implement the Global Information Network Architecture Technology 
to Integrate Operations at the National Response Coordination 
Center 
The capability to integrate the response and provide a common operating picture 
provided by the GINA technology would greatly improve operational command and 
control and improve the visibility, awareness and control required for rapid, effective and 
responsible disaster relief and response acquisition operations.  FEMA should 
immediately explore opportunities to use the GINA in this capacity. 
The GINA technology would provide marked increases in FEMA’s ability to 
integrate disparate communications and information systems to maintain a COP during a 
disaster, including operational response, as well as acquisition response, command and 
control. 
FEMA should work with the developers at NPS and USACE to initiate 
preliminary design and implementation planning for a small scale prototype test prior to 
the 2007 hurricane season.  This could possibly be accomplished via implementation on a 
mobile command and control platform, and then the technology rolled out at the NRCC 
and the Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs) in the following two years, 
consecutively.   
This moderately ambitious, yet metered approach allows time for further 
development, testing and troubleshooting at the initial Fort Leavenworth test site, yet 
fields the capability in parallel with this effort to gather additional development data.  As 
well, utilizing a test bed allows the experiment to be conducted alongside existing 
methods as a redundant measure. 
4. Pro-Actively Adopt Telework as a Strategic Human Capital Tool 
The roles, responsibilities and tasks carried out daily by acquisition professionals, 
aside from those in top leadership positions, are readily transferable to the Telework 
environment, given the proper information technology support.  Fully implementing the 
congressional mandate for promoting Telework, if integrated into the package of 
acquisition workforce initiatives currently underway at DHS and FEMA, could attract 
greater numbers of well qualified and motivated acquisition professionals to FEMA.   
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Telework could also decrease workforce hiring, management and retention costs.  
Successful, equitable and well managed Telework programs serve as major morale 
boosters and also holds potential for greatly increased productivity.  Happy, productive 
workers make better employees who are less likely to leave.  Fewer turnovers create 
greater efficiency, knowledge and professionalism and can be used to attract talented 
professionals.  All these factors, taken together, hold great cost reduction potential, both 
in personnel and operational costs. 
5. Create an Interagency Contracting Operations Cell within the 
National Response Coordination Center 
FEMA should create an Interagency Contracting Operations Cell (ICOC) within 
the NRCC.  This cell could function to provide oversight and guidance of the disaster 
relief and response contracting process when an event occurs.  The ICOC could also 
serve to advance the rapid diffusion of innovative, effective, and responsible acquisition 
concepts from one agency to another as part of the problem-solving dynamic that would 
be likely to occur during an emergent situation.   
The leadership of this cell should be senior enough and qualified enough to be 
vested with the requisite Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) decision-making authority.  
HCA authority would need to be granted in order to facilitate rapid response by 
acquisition and contracting professionals on the “front-lines” responding to the disaster.   
This concept would greatly strengthen the response by more quickly serving the 
information and decision needs of the acquisition and contracting professionals 
responding.  It would also strengthen the transparency of the process and increase the 
ability to successfully juggle the competing demands of regulatory compliance and rapid, 
agile reaction. 
As with the NRCC, the ICOC would greatly benefit from use of the GINA 
technology to create a COP that would include visibility of all contracting actions fed into 




6. Resource FEMA Appropriately and Ensure Stability of 
Organizational Placement 
Congress should ensure that FEMA consistently receives ample funding to 
maintain robust federal disaster response capabilities and to plan, prepare and train for the 
next disaster.  Never again should the organization’s preparedness be allowed to languish 
for lack of funding. 
As discussed in chapters IV and V, Congress took steps not only to increase 
FEMA operational funding, but also to ensure the most effective organizational 
placement of the agency by inserting several key provisions in the 2007 DHS 
Appropriations Bill.  Congress should continually work with the Administration to ensure 
these provisions are upheld in the future and are not bypassed, ignored or overturned.  
Thus ensuring the stability that FEMA needs to prepare for and respond to the next 
disaster. 
7. Update the Stafford Act, National Response Plan, and National 
Incident Management System to Reflect Lessons Learned from 
Katrina 
FEMA leadership, along with select emergency management professionals in 
state, local and regional organizations should work with Congress and the Administration 
to revamp and update the Stafford Act, the NRP and the NIMS to correct shortcomings 
that surfaced during the Katrina response.  For example, they should work to have the 
Stafford Act changed to insert language and mechanisms that allow for reimbursement of 
pre-disaster activities outside of the Catastrophic Incident Annex and ease restrictions on 
reimbursement if no disaster actually occurs.212 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) 
Husbanding contracts were drawn on extensively in DoD’s response to the 2004 




                                                 
212  U.S. Congress, Senate report, Foundational Recommendation #7 and White House report, 99. 
 106
structure husbanding contracts to include provisions for standing up a “Mini-Logistics 
Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)” contingency support arrangement in support 
of disaster response within the U.S.?213 
Many calls throughout the reports and literature relating to Katrina suggested 
implementing LOGCAP contracts for disaster response.  One of the most vocal 
proponents of this concept is Bill Carwile, the FCO in Mississippi during Katrina, who 
indicated that the mission planning and rapid response competencies of experienced 
LOGCAP contractors could prove a valuable asset in time of emergency.214  What 
implementation issues, pros and cons surround this concept?  What are the relevant 
statutory guidelines, political and social considerations? 
2. Requirements Generation and Communication Process 
One of the large concerns brought out in the literature surrounding the response to 
Katrina involved the requirements generation process, or lack of an organized and 
effective process, and the many difficulties in effectively communicating the 
requirements.  What would be an optimum, integrated and structured approach to 
requirements generation and communication of those requirements to the organizations 
charged with fulfilling the requirements? 
3. Structuring an Interagency Contracting Operations Center 
What would be the optimum framework, including business rules and protocols, 
required statutory authorities, staffing, resources, and required technologies for standing 
up an Interagency Contracting Operations Center?  What training, education and drilling 
requirements should be in place? 
4. DDX Concept and Other DLA Initiatives 
Beginning in 2006, the DLA initiated partnering arrangements to provide FEMA 
with extensive supply chain logistics and resource support.  What are the details of these 
arrangements and how could these innovations be exported to other disaster support 
arrangements?  How feasible is the DDX concept as a disaster response capability?  How 
                                                 
213  Captain Steve Shapro, Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Seminar Guest Speaker, 
(November 2, 2006). 
214  Bill Carwile interview, (September 16, 2006). 
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did it perform in its first deployment and what are some recommendations for 
improvement?  How could FEMA disaster relief and response contracting personnel 
utilize the DDX as a base of operations?  Is this even advisable? 
5. Telework, An In Depth Cost Benefit Analysis 
Proactively managed telecommuting programs have been heralded as a cost 
saving, efficient, productivity increasing and morale boosting human capital 
strategy/initiative.  Its use has been congressionally mandated and it is being strongly 
encouraged, especially in the acquisition workforce.215  Provide an in-depth cost benefit 
analysis and discuss the implement issues, positives and negatives surrounding the 
concept. 
6. National Interagency Fire Center-Style Response Organization 
The National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) provides a coordinated, resourced 
and proactive approach to wildfire management and response.  It exists as a collaborative 
and well organized support center for operational planning, response and combat logistics 
for wild land firefighting.216  What lessons could be learned and exported from the NIFC, 
in broad organization-wide command and control terms and in narrower systems 
development acquisition and resource acquisition terms? 
7. Political and Social Considerations 
What are the political and social considerations surrounding federal emergency 
response, especially with respect to acquiring and providing goods and services?  What 
obligations does the federal government have during a disaster?  What rights and 
obligations does the individual citizen have during a disaster?  Structure a decision-
making model to help guide this decision process. 
D. SUMMARY 
This project outlined many of the failures in the federal response to Hurricane 
Katrina.  In addition to the overwhelming magnitude of the storm, there are myriad  
 
                                                  
215  U.S. Office of Personnel Management website, Telework laws. 
216  National Interagency Fire Center Website, NIFC Mission.  [http://www.nifc.gov/ nifcmiss.html].  
Accessed November 2006. 
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reasons why the federal response proved inadequate.  One major point of failure was the 
acquisition and contracting apparatus, especially at FEMA.  This needs to be fixed before 
the next large scale disaster.   
The perspectives, reviews and research into innovative ideas included in the 
project provide a fresh outlook and a starting point for solving several of the concerns 
expressed by all involved and can contribute to resolving some of the major issues 
identified.  In this endeavor, the authors sincerely hope this project assists, in some 
measurable way, those with the power to make a difference. 
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